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Abstract 
 
Human enhancements will dramatically alter individuals' capabilities and lead to serious harm if 
unregulated. However, it is unclear how states should act to mitigate this harm. I argue that the 
capabilities approach provides a useful metric to determine what action states should take regarding 
each enhancement technology. According to the capabilities approach, states are responsible for 
ensuring their citizens are able to function in certain ways that are essential to human life. I consider 
the impact of a range of enhancements on individuals' capabilities in order to determine what 
actions states should take regarding each technology. I find that in order to be just and prevent 
harmful inequality, states will need to ensure many enhancements are available to their citizens. I 
also explore a range of other regulations aimed at harm prevention. Considering the impact of 
enhancement technologies on human capabilities, and the appropriate regulatory options for states, 
under the guide of the capabilities approach allows me to demonstrate that the capabilities approach 
can provide valuable, realistic, advice to guide public policy in response to enhancement 
technologies. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Left unregulated, technology that alters what people are able to do will cause vast, inescapable, 
inequalities. Those who can afford these technologies will find themselves at a huge advantage in 
society, enjoying even greater benefits than they do now as they enhance themselves beyond 
anything humans are naturally capable of, while those unable to afford these technologies will be 
left unable to participate in society to even a basic level. In Swindells (2014) I argued that, for states 
to be successful in preventing harmful inequality, they must ensure essential technologies are 
available to all of their citizens. However, the question of how states can determine which 
technologies they must ensure their citizens can access in order to prevent harmful inequality, and 
so meet the requirements of justice, remains. In this thesis I argue that the capabilities approach 
provides a framework that allows states to determine which technologies they must ensure their 
citizens are able to access in order to be just and avoid harmful inequality.  
 
In Swindells (2014) I argued that inequality of access to enhancement technologies will exacerbate 
current harmful inequalities; the wealthy already benefit from their financial situation and future 
enhancements can be expected to increase this advantage. For example, the wealthy can already use 
their position to access better education and nutrition, which in turn enhances their cognitive 
functioning (Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2007, p. 1159). Future enhancement technologies have 
the potential to allow the wealthy to further increase their IQ beyond even that of the most naturally 
gifted. Cognitive enhancements have many benefits beyond higher job status and salary; they can 
reduce the risk of substance abuse, crime, and many illnesses while increasing quality of life, social 
connectedness, and political participation (Sandberg and Bostrom, 2007, p. 208). Consequently, the 
benefits associated with higher IQ, such as increased income (Sandberg and Bostrom, 2007, p. 216), 
and prevention of a wide array of social and economic misfortunes (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009, 
p. 330), are likely to increasingly become solely available to those who are financially better-off, 
further increasing the advantages packaged with wealth. This will exacerbate inequality by 
providing further benefits to those with the ability to pay, and preventing the least well-off from 
accessing these benefits. 
 
States should be concerned with the potential of enhancement technologies to increase inequality as 
a range of negative outcomes are associated with more unequal states, and these negative outcomes 
apply to everyone in that society, not just the least well-off. For example, individuals in states with 
higher levels of inequality are at greater risk of mental disability and psychiatric hospitalization 
(Hudson, 2005, p. 16); and they can also be expected to have lower economic mobility (Andrews 
and Leigh, 2009, p. 1492); as well as poorer general health; higher levels of infant mortality; lower 
average life expectancy; increased obesity; greater illicit drug use; higher homicide and violent 
crime; a greater prevalence of depression; and, lower self-reported well-being (De Vries, Gosling, 
and Potter, 2011, p. 1978). This increase in negative outcomes can be at least partly attributed to an 
increased importance of social hierarchy in a more unequal society. In such a society an individual's 
position relative to others is more important, and, consequently, individuals become more 
competitive, less trusting, more self-focused, less friendly, and less cooperative (De Vries, Gosling, 
and Potter, 2011, p. 1979). More unequal societies have lower levels of agreeableness, and 
associated negative health outcomes, such as poor diet, and increased alcohol and cigarette 
consumption (De Vries, Gosling, and Potter, 2011, p. 1984). These numerous social problems are 
more common in unequal societies, for everyone in the society, not just the less well-off (Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2007, p, 1972). Therefore, increased inequality, and the associated negative 
consequences, should be of concern to both the less and more well-off in society, and a just state 
should act to mitigate inequality and prevent these harms. 
 
There is also a concern that the development of technologies that fundamentally alter what humans 
are capable of could negatively impact the idea of natural human equality that is the basis of 
political and moral equality (Fukuyama, 2002, p. 9-10). The concern is that the development of 
these technologies could create an uncrossable divide between the enhanced and the unenhanced, 
creating two distinct classes of people. This concern is coupled with the idea that in the future when 
there are greatly enhanced people there is no guarantee that they will care about the unenhanced, 
those in poverty, and they may be unwilling to pay for public goods, such as education (Singer, 
2014, p. 4470). Therefore, the development of these enhancement technologies may even further 
increase the importance of one's position in the hierarchy of society by creating two completely 
separate classes of humans where the enhanced individuals may not feel the need to protect and 
ensure the well-being of the unenhanced. A solid immovable hierarchy would form where, based on 
ability to pay, some people would be significantly better-off than others, who would never have the 
ability to catch up as they cannot afford the technology necessary for class mobility. There is 
concern that those able to afford enhancement technologies will be buying their own well-being at 
the expense of a greater social good (Caplan and Elliott, 2004, p. 174). Unregulated enhancement 
technology can be expected to increase class struggle and the importance of one's position in the 
hierarchy, further increasing the harms associated with inequality for all members of society.  
 
Harm, such as that created by inequality, does not require extreme deprivations to warrant 
consideration; injustices exist even when no extreme deprivation is present. For example, if a HET 
increased political influence for those who could afford it, such as by allowing increased 
communication capacities, this would be an injustice to those who do not have access to this 
technology, although they suffer no extreme deprivation (Buchanan, 2011b, p. 250). States must act 
to mitigate the harms that the development of enhancement technologies can be expected to 
exacerbate, even if they are not associated with extreme deprivation.  
 
Approaches to public policy can increase inequality by pushing the technology underground, 
increasing cost, and primarily allowing the rich access, or reduce inequality by supporting 
responsible development and ensuring broad access. Without public funding and support, it is likely 
that some enhancement technologies will be out of reach of many. The divide between those who 
are 'normal' and those who are enhanced above average will continue to grow, and be based on 
individuals’ ability to pay. In Swindells (2014) I argued that the best solution for regulating the 
consequences from enhancements is for the state to ensure that technologies which are necessary 
are not solely available based on ability to pay, and, further, that this option is best not just for the 
less well-off but also for the wealthy. I argued that unregulated access, in a free-market system, 
would be problematic as it would lead to the kind of inequality states must attempt avoid. I also 
argued that an outright ban on these technologies would be unsuccessful at mitigating harm as it is 
unlikely to be practically enforceable, and attempts to enforce such a ban would likely lead to 
increased inequality. Further, I argued that an outright ban would also be undesirable as it would 
remove the possibility of individuals and society enjoying the benefits of many enhancement 
technologies. Enhancement technologies have the potential to provide many benefits to both 
individuals and society provided that they are fairly distributed. Therefore, I concluded that states 
should ensure that important enhancement technologies are available to all of their citizens through 
public funding, as well as regulations on development and patents, that ensure lower costs and that 
access is possible for all.  
 
This thesis will further examine these conclusions under the guide of the capabilities approach in 
order to develop a framework for states to determine how they must act in regards to enhancement 
technologies. Ultimately I conclude that the capabilities approach supports the state acting to ensure 
enhancement technologies to their citizens in order to prevent harmful inequality, but also that, at 
times, the capabilities approach may require the state to undertake further regulations, such as bans 
or other policies, to ensure that the basic entitlements of their citizens are secured.  
 
Definitions 
 
Human Enhancement Technology (HET) 
This thesis is concerned with the impact and regulation of Human Enhancement Technology. The 
term 'Human Enhancement Technology' (HET) refers to any technology that increases or enhances 
what people are able to do. This ranges from a ballpoint pen that increases communication abilities 
to a bicycle that increases individuals' transport and movement abilities. In the future, HETs will be 
developed that allow people to learn quickly and improve selective retention, unlearn phobias and 
addictions, increase fine-grained control over the learning process, increase creativity, improve 
memory, change our personality, grow new organs, repair our brains, and extend life expectancy 
beyond 100 years (Sandberg and Bostrom, 2007, p. 203-207; Fukuyama, 2002, p. 8-9). Many HETs 
are not directly or permanently attached to individuals, such as reading glasses, but they are 
nonetheless considered HET due to their ability to increase or improve human abilities. This will be 
the same for technologies that are developed in the future.  
 
Although increasing human capabilities is the definition of HET, many were not originally 
developed for this purpose. Many were developed as therapies for disabilities, such as Ritalin, 
which was developed as a treatment for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and is now used by 
college students to enhance their cognition (Lamkin, 2012, p. 347). Similarly, Modafinil was 
originally developed as a treatment for narcolepsy, and is now used to reduce performance 
decrements from sleep loss or jet lag (Sandberg and Bostrom, 2007, p. 204). Because of this, the 
exact HETs that will be developed in the future are unclear, and predicting their outcomes is 
difficult. Therefore, this thesis takes a very broad approach to the term 'Human Enhancement 
Technology’ and relies only on the fact that they are technologies that increases what humans are 
able to do in order to group them together under the term 'HET'. 
 
Central Capabilities 
This thesis argues that the justness of the state, and its equality, can be judged by its success in 
fulfilling the basic requirements outlined by the capabilities approach. This position is argued for in 
chapter 2. The capabilities approach argues that individuals are entitled to be able to be and do 
certain things, to achieve certain central capabilities, and that ensuring that its citizens have this 
ability is the basic requirement of a just state. The ability to achieve these central capabilities is 
what makes a life one of human dignity, as it allows individuals to achieve the lives they have 
reason to value. A detailed analysis of exactly which capabilities are included under the term 
'central capabilities', and are the basic entitlements of any human, is also developed in chapter 2.  
 
Equality 
Throughout this thesis I refer to equality in the sense defined by the capabilities approach. Under 
this approach, two individuals who are equally able to achieve the central capabilities can be 
considered equal, even if they do not both actually achieve them; what is important is their 
opportunity to achieve their basic entitlement (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 289). Individuals need not be the 
same in every respect to be equal, but they ought to have the same opportunities to achieve in 
essential areas. Rather than focusing on numerical equality, and treating individuals as 
indistinguishable, the state should treat individuals proportionally to their endowments. At times 
this will require providing more help to some than others to ensure that all are able to achieve the 
central capabilities they are entitled to. For example, a pregnant woman requires more food than a 
comparable woman who is not pregnant, and, thus, needs different resources to be equally able to 
achieve the essential functioning of being fully nourished.  
 
The state should both be concerned with mitigating the involuntary differences between individuals, 
and ensuring that individuals are not held to ransom by their past actions. If individuals' past actions 
mean that they are now unable to achieve a central capability then the state still has some 
responsibility to these individuals. For example, consider an individual, who, when she was a 
teenager, did not fully engage in the schooling that was offered and now has a limited ability to 
communicate or pursue higher paying employment. It does not seem just that the state could simply 
'wash their hands' of this person, but rather the capabilities approach would require that it should if 
possible allow this individual the opportunity to achieve these capabilities now, for example by 
providing adult education classes. Although this is not explicitly required by the capabilities 
approach it seems to be a natural consequence of the theory. In this case, personal responsibility is 
still relevant as the individual must now act to accept the adult education if she wishes to achieve 
these functionings. If the state ensures that all individuals, even those that rejected the option in the 
past, have the opportunity to achieve central capabilities then they are just, even if some individuals 
still choose to reject these capabilities for various reasons. What is essential under the capabilities 
approach is that people have the real opportunity to achieve these central capabilities that will allow 
them to pursue the lives they have reason to value with dignity and respect equal to that of others 
(Nussbaum, 2004, p. 40).  
 
Under the capabilities approach, individuals are entitled to certain central capabilities, and two 
individuals who are both able to achieve these central capabilities are equal in the respects that 
matter. However, the state should not pursue individuals being equally able to achieve capabilities 
simply because they value equality. Rather, although equality has instrumental value it is achieved 
as a by-product of states ensuring their citizens are able to achieve their basic entitlements. One 
individual may be more able to achieve a central capability than another individual, despite a state's 
best efforts to ensure they are both fully able to achieve this capability, but this state should not be 
considered unjust, and certainly should not remove the higher achieving citizen's ability to achieve 
simply to make them equal to the less able citizen. For example, states are not expected to ensure no 
one can see if there are some blind people that cannot be given sight. Rather, a state is just and 
equal if it does everything reasonably possible to ensure that all of its citizens with the potential to 
see are able to achieve this capability. Equality is sought not as a valuable end in itself, but rather as 
a means or by-product of the good just states are truly seeking, that is to mitigate harm and increase 
well-being.  
 
One of the primary responsibilities of the state is to ensure its citizens are able to achieve their basic 
entitlements, central capabilities. In doing so the state will ensure equality in important respects for 
its citizens. However, if two individuals are not equally able to achieve a central functioning this 
does not mean that the state should necessarily be considered unjust. Their responsibility is to 
ensure their citizens can achieve the central capabilities to the highest level reasonably possible, and 
at times individual differences will make it impossible for all individuals to fully achieve. Ideally 
the state would be able to ensure all individuals have the ability to fully achieve the central 
capabilities to which they are entitled. However, in order to be just, capabilities theorists claim that 
states simply must do whatever is reasonably possible towards achieving this goal (Nussbaum, 
2011, p. 27). Individual differences and luck seemingly make it impossible for states to be fully 
equal in this way, however, this does not make the goal less valuable. Inequality is harmful, for 
everyone in society, not simply the worst-off, and, thus, it is in the interest of the state and society to 
mitigate and reduce inequality as much as possible (Hudson, 2005, p. 16; Andrews and Leigh, 2009, 
p. 1492; De Vries, Gosling, and Potter, 2011, p. 1978; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2007, p, 1972). 
Simply put, even if full equality of central capabilities is an unachievable goal it is still a valuable 
pursuit and the pursuit of this kind of equality with the goal of harm prevention will be the focus of 
my thesis. 
 
Overview 
 
This thesis begins by outlining why the capabilities approach should be used as the measure of a 
just and equal state, and, therefore, why in this thesis I recommend it as the framework for states to 
determine what action they must take in regulating HETs. The capabilities approach judges the 
justness of a state by considering how well its citizens are doing in terms of what they are able to 
do, their capabilities. This approach defines well-being as functioning, rather than how individuals 
feel or how many goods they have (Sen, 1992, p. 39). States exist to protect and ensure their 
citizens basic well-being and the capabilities approach gives us a clear measure of whether they are 
achieving this goal. Therefore, the capabilities approach makes it the job of the state to ensure 
individuals can achieve their basic entitlements, defined as certain central capabilities. The 
capabilities approach judges a state as just and equal if they do their best to ensure their citizens’ 
central capabilities, and I argue that at times this requires the state to ensure that a HET is available 
to all of its citizens. 
 
To explore this argument I consider what would be required for a just state to be required to ensure 
a HET to its citizens. Under the capabilities approach the technology would have to be necessary 
for an individual to achieve a central capability that a just state is required to ensure. For a 
technology to be necessary for the central capabilities it would have to change what individuals 
need to be able to do in some important way; if the central capabilities can be adequately achieved 
without this technology there is no reason that a state should ensure it to its citizens. I argue that 
variation in the capabilities individuals can achieve is an intrinsic part of the capabilities approach, 
and, further, that altering capabilities is the purpose of many technologies, especially HET, as they 
are developed specifically to change what people are able to do. Therefore, the conclusion that 
some HETs will alter what is required for an individual to achieve the central capabilities seems to 
clearly follow.  
 
I argue that technologies can change what individuals are capable of in a way that fundamentally 
alters what is required for an individual to fully function as a citizen, and, therefore, alter what just 
states must ensure. When a HET alter what individuals must be able to do to fully function as a 
citizen in society, and pursue the life they have reason to value, then, under the capabilities 
approach, the state must ensure this technology if it is to be even minimally just. For a technology 
to alter the central capabilities that individuals are entitled to it must alter the capabilities that an 
individual requires to live a life of human dignity, and functioning, to a similar level to that of 
others. If a technology alters a central capability, meaning that it alters what an individual must be 
capable of in order to be considered a fully functioning citizen, then the capabilities approach 
requires a just state to ensure their citizens have access to this technology.  
 
After considering the potential of the capabilities approach to apply to the regulation of HETs, in 
chapters 3-4, in chapter 5 I consider an example of a HET that a just state is already expected to 
ensure, education. Education is a technology that is considered essential to individuals functioning 
in society, and, thus, states are expected to ensure it to all of their citizens in order to prevent serious 
inequality. Education provides many essential skills individuals require to participate in society and 
pursue the life they have reason to value, therefore, it is a HET that is necessary for individuals’ 
central capabilities and its provision is required by the capabilities approach.  
 
Chapters 6-7 consider a range of HETs that have similarly important impacts on individuals’ 
capabilities. These chapters examine these examples to demonstrate that a state having a 
responsibility to ensure these technologies is not significantly different to their current 
responsibility to ensure education. For example, those without access to the internet today are much 
less able to participate in society; they are less able to communicate with others, achieve fulfilling 
employment, or participate in normal play compared to their peers. Due to this potentially harmful 
and serious inequality of capabilities that a lack of access to the internet creates, I argue that under 
the capabilities approach some states may need to ensure their citizens have access to this 
technology to be just. Another example of HET that states may be required to ensure for their 
citizens is life extension technology, which will significantly alter individuals’ central capabilities 
for life. Inequality of access to this technology would have serious implications for society, and the 
ability of individuals to participate in it. An individual with a significantly shorter life expectancy 
than his peers will be much less able to achieve the life he has reason to value and function equally 
as a citizen, both measures of well-being. Therefore, under the capabilities approach these life 
extension technologies would also have to be ensured to all individuals by a just state.  
 
Because we cannot predict all the future technologies that will be developed, or their consequences, 
a successful framework must be able to apply to any technology that is developed. Therefore, in 
chapter 8, I consider genetic modification as an example to examine the capabilities approach's 
ability to apply to the regulation to HET more generally. Genetic modification could allow 
individuals to develop completely new spheres of capabilities, and, thus, predicting its impact on 
the central capabilities individuals need to participate in society is difficult, if not impossible. 
However, I argue that the capabilities approach is also able to deal with these kinds of unpredictable 
technologies.  
 
A state can use the capabilities approach to consider whether a new technology is necessary for its 
citizens to be able to fully function and pursue lives they have reason to value, then use this 
information to determine whether the state must ensure the availability of that technology to its 
citizens. It is unnecessary for me to go into detail about the impact of genetic modification, or any 
other potential HET, on our capabilities, rather, these examples are used to demonstrate how the 
capabilities approach can deal with the unpredictable nature of future technological developments. I 
argue that the capabilities approach provides such encompassing and flexible requirements for a just 
state, and its obligations to its citizens, that it can be expected to effectively deal with any 
developments that may arise in the future. Thus, the capabilities approach is an effective tool for 
combating inequality and harm posed by HET as it allows states to determine what regulatory 
actions will best prevent harm and ensure that the state is just.  
 In chapter 9, I consider the potential limitations of my thesis as well as the potential limitations on 
the use of the capabilities approach. This includes considering whether ensuring capability equality 
can be expected to solve the harms associated with other forms of inequality, concluding that a 
focus on ensuring capability equality is likely to be the most realistic and valuable approach for 
state policy to prevent harm. In this chapter, I also acknowledge that actions other than making the 
technology available will be required to ensure equality; for example, some individuals will not 
accept the technology even if it is freely available, and the state still has obligations to these 
individuals and must take other regulatory actions. I also consider the possibility of other solutions 
to prevent harm from HET, such as banning certain technologies. I argue that if these kinds of 
actions are necessary this too will be determined by the capabilities approach. 
 
I finally conclude that the capabilities approach is a productive and useful measure of the justness of 
a state and that it can be successfully used to determine what regulatory actions states must take 
regarding human enhancement technologies. Although I argue that the capabilities approach will 
require a just state to ensure many HETs to its citizens, the capabilities approach can also be used to 
determine other actions required to ensure justice and equality regarding each technology. This 
allows the state to use the capabilities approach to determine what actions they must take regarding 
any HET that is developed. My thesis defends and expands upon the conclusions found in Swindells 
(2014) but also provides further support for the use of the capabilities approach in determining the 
justness of a state by demonstrating its ability to cope with novel changes and technologies. 
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Chapter 2: The Capabilities Approach 
 
The primary responsibility of a state is to protect its citizens from harm and to ensure their basic 
entitlements are met. For a state to be just it must achieve this goal to the best of its ability. 
However, exactly what these entitlements are, and what it means for an individual to be free from 
harm remains a matter of contention. Traditional measures of justice have been compellingly 
rejected by the proponents of a new theory, the capabilities approach. The initial developers of the 
capabilities approach, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, argue that the capabilities approach 
avoids the numerous failings of other theories of justice, and, thus, is a more successful measure of 
a just and equal state. 
 
The benefits of the capabilities approach over other theories led to it quickly gaining respect. Since 
1990 the Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
have used the capabilities approach to enable inter-country comparisons and assess the quality of 
individuals' lives (UNDP, 1990). The capabilities approach allows comparisons to be effectively 
made between how well individuals are doing in terms of their ability to achieve certain central 
capabilities, and it allows states to be judged on their success in ensuring their citizens can achieve 
these basic entitlements. It also provides a practical guide for public policy developments and 
allows states to both be compared against each other and compared against an objective measure of 
justice to determine whether they have successfully achieved their requirements. The evidence 
suggests that the capabilities approach is worth considering as a measure of justice, and the 
arguments in this thesis further help to establish the successfulness of the capabilities approach.
1
 
 
                                         
1  A complete defence of the capabilities approach is outside the scope of this thesis and well discussed by others. 
(Specifically see: Sen 1979, 1984, and 1992, and Nussbaum 1997, among others). 
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The capabilities approach argues that the justness of a state should be measured by whether or not 
its citizens are able to achieve certain central capabilities, to do things that it argues are centrally 
important to human life, and pursue the lives they have reason to value (Sen, 1992, p. 81). The goal 
of a just state is to ensure that its citizens have sufficient and equal real opportunities to achieve any 
valuable end or life of their choice, to be or do what they have reason to value. Individuals must 
have the freedom to select between possible lives, which involves them being able to achieve any 
one of them; the one that is selected is irrelevant as it is the ability to choose that is valuable (Sen, 
1984, p. 319).  
 
The capabilities approach argues that states must focus on the actual outcomes their citizens can 
achieve, rather than on another measure such as the goods they hold. Under the capabilities 
approach, goods are only important as instruments to achieve other ends that are truly valuable, 
namely, having capabilities. Similarly, the capabilities approach does not encourage focus on how 
individuals feel in the way a utility measure does, because individuals are different and have diverse 
reactions to various circumstances, so utility provides an unreliable measure of equality (Nussbaum, 
1997, p. 281-283).  Sen (1992, p. 39) argues that, rather than considering an individual’s well-being 
in terms of what goods he holds, or how he feels about the goods he holds and the life he leads, a 
person's well-being can be seen as the quality of his functioning, his ability to be and do certain 
things central to human life. Holding resources or being happy does not necessarily equate to well-
being; an individual can be happy while being deprived, or hold many goods without being able to 
achieve the valuable ends that these goods are meant to ensure. Therefore, if states focus on utility 
or resources as measures of justice or equality they may not actually ensure that their citizens have 
well-being. Rather, states should focus on the outcomes that are important for their citizens to be 
able to achieve, as being able to achieve these is truly well-being, and resources, for example, are 
only instrumental for this goal. Due to differences between individuals the same goods may not 
allow them to achieve the same ends; a disabled individual may require a significant number of 
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goods to achieve the same level of mobility a non-disabled individual can achieve with very 
minimal resources. 
 
The capabilities approach also argues that states should not be judged on the outcomes their citizens 
actually achieve, but rather the ability of their citizens to achieve certain outcomes should they 
choose to do so. If states were judged by the functionings, being and doing certain things, their 
citizens actually achieved they might be compelled to reduce their citizens’ freedom by forcing 
them to achieve functionings they would otherwise freely choose to avoid. An individual may have 
the capability to achieve an essential functioning and freely choose not to, but if achieved 
functioning was the measure of a just state it would seem that the state should force the individual 
into achieving the functioning against his will in order for the state to be just. This seems wrong; a 
just state should not be one that infringes upon the rights and liberties of its citizens as individuals 
should have autonomous and free choices. Therefore, although actually achieved functioning is 
well-being, it is not a good way to judge a state as a citizen could live a full life without achieving 
every valuable functioning, and, in these cases, the state has no right to force functioning upon them 
(Nussbaum, 1997, p. 288-289). Therefore, the capabilities approach argues that the state should 
concern itself with individuals' abilities to function, that is, their capabilities. The state must focus 
on ensuring that its citizens have the opportunity to achieve the capabilities central to a human life; 
whether they choose to achieve them or not is the concern of that citizen, not the state. As long as its 
citizens have the real ability to achieve the functionings central to human life the state has done all 
that is required. 
 
The difference between ensuring that individuals have the ability to achieve functioning and forcing 
them to achieve functioning is highlighted by capability theorists using the difference between 
fasting and starving (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 288). Being fully nourished is an essential aspect of well-
being, but this does not mean that an individual choosing to fast and an individual starving 
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involuntarily should be judged as equally well-off. The individual choosing to fast, even though he 
has adequate access to food, has the ability to achieve the functioning of being fully nourished, 
although he chooses not to do so, and, thus, can still be said to be living a fulfilled life as his choice 
to not be nourished is freely made. While the person starving due to an involuntary lack of food 
lacks an essential component of a fulfilled life as he has no choice whether he eats or not, and, thus, 
the state has not fulfilled its obligation to this individual. This example highlights how a focus on 
the ability to function, rather than actually achieved functioning, allows the justness of states to be 
measured without requiring states to reduce their citizens' liberty by pushing them into unwanted 
functionings (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 288).  
 
Capabilities theorists claim that states exist in order to ensure the basic entitlements of their citizens, 
and, in turn, that these basic entitlements are certain central capabilities, the ability to achieve 
certain functionings (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). Nussbaum (1997, p. 274) supports the commonly 
held view that entitlements are correlated with duties, and, as such, if someone has an entitlement to 
something, there exists a duty to ensure it. States have a duty to ensure certain central capabilities to 
their citizens as these are individuals’ basic entitlements and securing them is the primary purpose 
of the state (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 26). The capabilities approach argues that all humans have a basic 
entitlement to certain central capabilities, and in order to be just states have a duty to ensure their 
citizens have these basic entitlements. Therefore, states can be judged and compared by how well 
they ensure their citizens the central capabilities to which they are entitled. For a state, and the 
individuals within it, to be considered as 'doing well' individual citizens must have an adequate 
level of well-being, and this requires they have the capability to achieve certain central functionings 
(beings and doings) (Sen, 1992, p. 40-41).   
 
Charles Beitz (1986, p. 287) raises a concern with the capabilities approach by arguing that it faces 
serious difficulty because not all capabilities should be equally weighted. Sen (1992, p. 45) 
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responds to this objection by arguing that the distinction between capabilities is an essential aspect 
of the approach. He argues that not all capabilities are valuable, nor are all that are valuable equally 
important, rather, the relative importance or weighting of different capabilities depends on the 
society and its application should be culture dependent (Sen, 1979, p. 219; Sen, 1992, p. 46). Sen 
generally leaves the capabilities he thinks states must ensure vague and open to interpretation, he 
believes that it should be up to individual democratic states to determine which capabilities are 
essential in their context. This is because, he argues, the differences between states, locations and 
cultures are such that they are the only ones that can determine which capabilities are essential for 
their citizens (Sen, 1979, p. 219). For example, one state may determine that it is central that its 
citizens have the capability to communicate instantly with anyone, anywhere, in the world, while 
another state determines that its citizens only need to be able to communicate with others in their 
immediate vicinity.  
 
However, Nussbaum (2003, p. 35) argues that Sen's response to the problem of selecting and 
weighting capabilities is insufficient. She argues that his proposal that individual democratic states 
should be able to determine what capabilities to ensure, and their relative weighting, is problematic 
due to the potential for them to be weighted in a harmful way (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 41-47). 
Obviously not all freedoms or capabilities are important, some are even harmful, such as the 
freedom to rape and beat your wife. If individual states are able to choose the capabilities they 
ensure, and their weighting, they have the potential to select unimportant, or even harmful, 
capabilities and fail to ensure those that are essential (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 41-46). Nussbaum (2003, 
p. 46-47) argues that it is hopeless to simply state that 'all citizens are entitled to freedom 
understood as capability', as Sen seems to suggest we do, as from this it would be impossible to say 
whether a society is just or not. Instead she argues that the entitlement to certain central capabilities 
is pre-political, and this entitlement belongs to people independently of membership to a state; these 
entitlements would be there even in the absence of any political institution (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). 
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Therefore, it is irrelevant what each state believes it must ensure as all humans have the same basic 
entitlements that any state must ensure if it is to be just. These basic, pre-political, entitlements 
generate the requirements that political institutions must meet in order to be even minimally just, as 
it is the job of the state to secure the basic entitlements, central capabilities, all humans are entitled 
to (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25-27).  
 
Nussbaum's claim is that there are certain requirements a state must meet to be just and that this 
allows us to objectively judge the justness of a state. If states were able to determine their own 
requirements of justice then meeting these requirements would not hold much weight, nor tell us 
much about the conditions of life for individuals within that state. One state could argue that only 
the capability to walk around your own room was essential, and, thus, it could have high marks 
without actually ensuring anything else for its citizens. Similarly, a state could argue that the 
capability to beat your children was important while the capability to avoid being beaten was not, 
and this state, with many beaten children, obviously with a low level of well-being, would also be 
given high marks. Conversely, a state that argued that it was essential for all its citizens to enjoy 
helicopter rides and champagne for breakfast would be given low marks if its citizens were unable 
to do this, even if they were all in good health and had all of the capabilities that would generally be 
considered essential for a full life. 'Just' according to a state’s own measure does not ensure its 
justice at all. Leaving it up to states to determine which capabilities are essential to ensure has the 
potential to result in harmful outcomes.  
 
Sen could respond that a democratic state would not agree that these kinds of capabilities are those 
worth defending. However, some states do argue that harmful capabilities are essential while 
ignoring others that are generally considered essential. For example, in 2009 a law was approved in 
Afghanistan that allowed Shia men to withhold food from their wives if they did not have sex with 
them, effectively condoning marital rape (Page, 2009). Further, if Sen believes that most states can 
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be expected to select similar capabilities as those worth defending then it seems that a broad 
objective list can be created that all states would agree to.  
 
Nussbaum (2003, p. 35) argues that without commitment to an external list of essential capabilities 
we cannot know what even the minimum requirements of a just state are. She points out that under 
Sen's guidance the Human Development Reports of the UNDP do not specify a given level of health 
service or educational provision that a just society must deliver, they simply compare nations in 
these areas (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 35). This means that they can only compare the justness of states to 
each other, this could mean that while some are better than others none meet even the minimum 
requirements of justice. Nussbaum (2003, p. 36) argues that creating a list of the central capabilities 
individuals are entitled to allows the capabilities approach to provide a definite and useful guide for 
the basic entitlements a state must ensure to their citizens to be just. This, in turn, allows more than 
simply comparing states to each other, it allows us to judge states against a minimum level of 
justice to determine whether they are just, not only if they are doing better than their neighbour. If 
we simply compare states to others, one state may be described as more just than another even 
though it too is unjust. An external, objective, list or requirement of justice will allow states to be 
judged separately from other states while also allowing them to be compared to each other along a 
scale of justness.  
 
As an alternative to Sen's problematic lack of specification, Nussbaum provides a detailed list of the 
central capabilities that she argues should be the goal of public policy (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 277). 
Nussbaum's focus is on creating a working list of central capabilities that can be the focus of 
political planning, by encompassing the human capabilities that are of central importance to any 
human life (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 286). The list should allow people from different traditions and 
backgrounds, with different conceptions of the good, to agree that the capabilities included are those 
necessary for pursuing the good life (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 286). Nussbaum's list is always open to be 
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contested or remade but at this stage it is in the form of 10 central capabilities. They are as follows 
(Nussbaum, 1997, p. 287-288);  
1) Life: To avoid premature death and live the length of a normal human life. 
2) Bodily Health: To have adequate nourishment, shelter, and good health. 
3) Bodily Integrity: To be free from violent assault, have opportunities for sexual satisfaction, 
choice in reproduction, and to be able to move around freely.   
4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought: To use your human senses, imagine, think, and reason in 
a way developed by education, to express yourself as you choose, to use your own mind in a 
useful way, and to experience pleasure and avoid non-beneficial pain.  
5) Emotions: To be emotionally attached to things outside ourselves, to love, be loved, grieve, 
be grateful, experience longing, and be angry when appropriate.  
6) Practical Reason: To critically reflect on your life and your own conception of the good.  
7) Affiliation: (a) To interact socially, show concern for others, and have compassion. (b) To 
respect yourself and be treated as a dignified human being who is equally worthy to others.  
8) Other Species: To have concern for, and live in relation to, plants and non-human animals.  
9) Play: To enjoy pleasurable activities, to play, and laugh. 
10) Control Over Your Environment: (a) to effectively participate in political activities and 
choices over your life and to have the right to participate politically. (b) To be able to own 
property of all kinds, to be employed, and to be free from unwarranted search and seizure.  
 
The capabilities on this list are separate and indispensable, where one cannot be satisfied by giving 
a larger amount of another, as all are of central importance and distinct in quality (Nussbaum, 1997, 
p. 288). Not all human capabilities are included on Nussbaum's list as humans have all kinds of 
capabilities and not all of them are necessary for human dignity, some are inherently bad, such as 
the capabilities for cruelty, while others are trivial and need not be ensured by a just state 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). If a capability belongs on Nussbaum's list then states have an obligation to 
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protect and secure it for their citizens, using law and public policy (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 26). The 
capabilities required for a life worthy of human dignity are each part of a minimum account of 
social justice, and if a state fails to ensure these to its citizens it is not just and is failing its citizens 
(Nussbaum, 2003, p. 40).  
 
In order to successfully secure a capability a state must ensure both the external preparation for 
action and choice as well as the circumstances that make it possible to exercise that function 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). For example, certain political and material circumstances, plus the ability 
to speak, developed through education, make it possible to have the capability of free speech 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). States could educate their citizens to be eloquent speakers, but they have 
not ensured their citizens have the capability for free speech unless they also ensure them the 
political right to speak freely in public (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). Nussbaum (1997, p. 290) argues 
that public policy should be aimed at this kind of 'combined' capability, ensuring individuals have 
the required internal states as well as ensuring the environment is suitable for the functioning. 
Providing this is the minimum requirement for a state to be just. States must ensure their citizens are 
able to achieve the central capabilities they are entitled to, but they need not push individuals into 
choosing to actually perform the functioning (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 290).  
 
The capabilities approach argues that states must take action to actively secure their citizens the 
central capabilities to which they are entitled. They cannot simply avoid infringing upon them, 
rather they must actively prepare the institutional and material environment required for every 
citizen to have the ability to achieve their basic entitlements, that is, central capabilities necessary 
for a life of human dignity (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 31). This requires states to consider the obstacles 
preventing their citizens from achieving their full entitlement of capabilities and take action to 
remove these obstacles (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32).  
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In the same way that states do not need to ensure their citizens can achieve every possible 
capability, they also do not need to ensure even the central capabilities on Nussbaum's list to the 
highest level they can possibly be achieved to. Nussbaum (2011, p. 27) specifies that it is reasonable 
to set the level of the capabilities that must be ensured quite high, but argues that it would be wrong 
to set it to a utopian level that removes the possibility of ensuring them. The level that is specified 
must also be responsive to the conditions of human life now, as it is unrealistic and unachievable if 
it requires a total transformation of the world in order to achieve it (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 27). In this 
way Nussbaum's approach reflects the sentiments of Sen's lack of specification by recognising the 
importance of responding to variations between the needs and circumstances of various states. 
Capabilities can be achieved to a variety of levels, and states need not ensure that their citizens can 
achieve all of the central capabilities to the highest level possible. Rather, Nussbaum argues, states 
must ensure their citizens can achieve the central capabilities to the highest level that each state can 
reasonably ensure to its citizens.  
 
However, Nussbaum's lack of specification over what it means to ensure the central capabilities to 
the highest level possible is problematic. In a similar manner to Nussbaum's concern over Sen's lack 
of specification over which capabilities are essential it seems that we may need to be concerned 
over Nussbaum's lack of specification of what level the capabilities she claims are central must be 
ensured to. It is unclear exactly what level a state must ensure capabilities to in order to be just. It 
could be that a state would claim that it has ensured a capability to the best of its ability while many 
of its citizens still fail to achieve this capability to the degree that is necessary for them to fully 
function as citizens. At times the state's claim may be legitimate; if some of its citizens have 
incurable blindness, for example, then it does seem that this state has done everything reasonably 
possible to ensure the capability of sight even though some individuals still lack the capability. 
However, in other examples this may be less clear. Consider, for example, a state that offers eye 
glasses to correct the vision of those with vision problems, but does not offer laser surgery, and so 
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this further enhancement can only be accessed by the wealthy. In this case, it is less clear if the state 
has done everything reasonably possible to ensure its citizens have the central capability of sight to 
the highest level reasonably possible. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to judge the justness of 
states when the highest level reasonably possible is something that can only realistically be 
determined by the state itself. In the same way that Nussbaum feared states could choose to ensure 
harmful capabilities if the important capabilities were left to them to determine, they could also 
choose to not ensure the central capabilities to a high enough level by simply claiming that they 
were ensuring them to the highest level reasonably possible.  
 
One potential solution is to integrate a theory such as the doctrine of sufficiency into the capabilities 
approach. The doctrine of sufficiency is based on the claim that inequality itself is not problematic, 
it is only harmful when those at the bottom do not have enough (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 22). Therefore, 
the claim is that harm is best prevented not by aiming for everyone to have the same, but by 
ensuring everyone (especially those at the bottom) has enough (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 21). 
Incorporating the doctrine of sufficiency with the capabilities approach may allow a state to be 
judged not on whether it has ensured a capability to the highest level reasonably possible, but rather 
whether it has ensured that all of its citizens have all of the central capabilities to a level sufficient 
to allow them to fully function as citizens and lead the lives they have reason to value. This level 
too would vary from state to state, but it would be able to be judged objectively by a third party.  
 
Due to the harms inequality poses to everyone in society, not just the worst off, I do not fully 
support the claims of the doctrine of sufficiency as it argues that inequality is not harmful, and we 
should only care that those at the bottom have enough (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 22). Nor do I support its 
focus on resources, as, as discussed in chapter 2, resources are an unreliable measure of well-being. 
However, I do support the doctrine of sufficiency's claim that our primary concern in combating 
inequality should not be to bring everyone to the same level, but rather that we should aim to bring 
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everyone to a sufficient level. It seems clear, for the reasons discussed in chapter 1, that inequality is 
harmful not only because some do not have enough but also for the negative consequences 
associated with increased inequality. Therefore, a more productive solution is to compromise 
between a focus on everyone having enough (sufficiency), and reducing inequality as much as 
possible to mitigate the harms associated with a more unequal society. This would mean that the 
state should aim to ensure both that all of its citizens are sufficiently able to achieve the central 
capabilities and that there is not a huge discrepancy between the capabilities of the most and least 
well-off. 
 
States may be unable to fully solve inequality, or perfectly ensure all of their citizens are able to 
sufficiently achieve the central capabilities, but they can still be considered just. We should not 
consider something unjust unless something can be done about it (Temkin, 1993, p. 13). If states 
ensure the central capabilities to the best of their ability they should not be considered unjust if 
nothing more can be done. It seems that the doctrine of sufficiency fits within Nussbaum's 
conception of the capabilities approach, as she talks about capabilities as minimum requirements of 
justice as they, at even a minimal level, allow individuals to function properly as citizens. Therefore, 
throughout this thesis I do not simply consider states just if they ensure capabilities to the highest 
level they claim is reasonably possible. Rather, I argue that states must ensure capabilities to at least 
a minimum level that allows an individual to fully function as a citizen in that society. Although this 
is not a position explicitly argued for by capabilities theorists, it clearly fits within at least 
Nussbaum's conception of the responsibilities of a just state, and, thus, is only a minor modification 
of the approach.  
 
The capabilities approach was developed to measure the equality and justness of a state in terms of 
its ability to ensure its citizens' well-being, defined as their ability to achieve certain functionings. 
Inequality is undesirable, as it leads to harm and lower well-being. However, in order to solve 
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inequality and prevent harm we need to be able to determine what it means for a state to be equal in 
a way that avoids these harms. States exist in order to secure the basic entitlements of their citizens, 
and, therefore, a state that successfully completes this task can be considered just and individuals 
whose basic entitlements are met should be considered equal, as far as the state is concerned. There 
are many ways well-being and equality can be judged, however, due to its substantial benefits and 
practicality I will use the capabilities approach to further assess the conclusions of Swindells (2014) 
that states must ensure HET to their citizens. Specifically, I use Nussbaum's list of central 
capabilities due to its practical nature for this type of discussion. I do not attempt to defend the 
approach beyond what is required for a full understanding of it. However, its usefulness and 
applicability will be reflected on in light of its relation to HET. The capabilities approach provides a 
method for measuring how well people are doing within and between states, it allows judgement of 
whether an individual has a fair deal in life and whether a state is fulfilling its requirements. The 
capabilities approach is already used by the UNDP when comparing outcomes between states, and, 
therefore, assessing it further in this thesis will also provide more support for its use.
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Chapter 3: HET and Capabilities 
 
The development of HETs changes what humans are capable of; they give us new abilities and 
allow us to reach new levels in terms of our abilities. A central idea of the capabilities approach is 
that human capabilities can be developed and changed through the use of technology, HETs are 
developed specifically for this purpose. Because humans' natural abilities can be increased and 
developed through the use of a variety of technologies the impact of these technologies can be 
assessed through the capabilities approach.  
 
Technology can alter the level to which capabilities can be attained. For example, humans' innate 
communication abilities only allow us to express basic needs and desires to others through methods 
such as crying, laughing, or making basic sounds. Nussbaum (1997, p. 289) refers to this kind of 
capability as a basic capability. However, this is not the full extent of our ability to communicate. 
As we grow we learn new methods of communication, such as using spoken and written language, 
to express more complex thoughts and emotions, developing what Nussbaum (1997, p. 289) calls 
'internal capabilities'. Capabilities are not simply either achieved or not, but, rather, they can be 
achieved to varying degrees. An individual with only the communication methods they were born 
with can communicate to a much lower level than an individual who has been educated in written 
and spoken languages. A person who can use written and spoken languages has a greater capability 
for communication as they can share complex ideas with others, who also have this ability, over 
great distances in time and space. Capabilities exist on a spectrum. Humans are born with a set of 
capabilities, and, through learning and the use of technology, they are able to change their position 
on this spectrum.  
 
The idea that technology can change capabilities is commonly considered in discussions of the 
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capabilities approach. Nussbaum (1997, p. 289-290) describes basic capabilities being developed by 
technology to form internal capabilities, before the environment is readied by the state for combined 
capabilities to become true possibilities. For example, an individual is born with a basic ability to 
communicate, through basic noises such as crying, laughing, or even smiling. This is then 
developed into a greater communication capability, through the use of technologies such as the 
internet or education in formal languages, to allow an individual to communicate much more 
effectively with others. Finally, this ability is turned into a combined capability, an individual's 
internal capability to achieve the functioning combined with the external conditions to make fully 
achieving this capability possible, such as ensuring that an individual is able to speak freely without 
fear of persecution. Sen gives the example of a bicycle as a technology that changes individuals' 
capability for movement (Sen, 1983, p. 160). Considering the use of technology altering individual's 
capabilities, specifically their internal capabilities, is clearly not controversial in discussions of the 
capabilities approach.  
 
Technology alters what individuals are capable of. It does not simply allow people to get closer to 
the highest possible level of functioning in a certain area; its use expands the sphere of possible 
functioning, by raising the maximum level of potential functioning. Capabilities can be expanded 
both by natural maturation and learning, and also through changes in the material environment, such 
as mind tools that extend our thinking capabilities (Johnstone, 2007, p. 77-79). Technology can 
significantly alter the actions an individual can perform, and the kinds of outcomes he can create 
(Johnstone, 2007, p. 74).  If the sphere of possible human capabilities was set by our nature, and 
technologies simply allowed us to reach different points within this sphere, this would require our 
innate capacity for communication to include the ability to communicate instantly with someone on 
the other side of the world, as the use of a phone or email does. However, this is not the case as 
doing so requires the use of technology in addition to our natural endowments, and, therefore, 
expands our natural sphere of communication capabilities. The ability to use a phone to talk 
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instantly with someone on the other side of the world added this capability to the sphere of human 
communication capabilities, rather than allowing us to obtain a functioning that already existed 
within our sphere of natural communication capabilities. Technology is developed to make it easier 
for people to complete necessary tasks, and to allow them to complete new tasks that were 
previously impossible, therefore, it is easy to see how technology can change individuals’ 
capabilities. 
 
HET encompasses all technologies that alter human capabilities; by definition, HET is technology 
that enhances what humans are able to do, that is, it enhances their capabilities. In the future, new 
HET will be developed that will have an even greater impact on people's capabilities. Although 
human communication abilities have already been extended with the development of written and 
spoken language, phones, and the internet, our ability to communicate is likely to be even further 
increased by future technology. For example, a direct computer-brain interface may allow 
individuals to access all of the abilities created by the internet, simply by thinking about it. An 
individual who can instantly communicate with another individual on the other side of the world 
simply by thinking about it, without the need to actively use an external device, will clearly have a 
greater ability to communicate than we have today.  
 
Technologies such as calculators and computer programs provide additional examples of HET that 
alter capabilities. These devices allow individuals to calculate complex sums without sustaining 
mental strain, or having to obtain years of education, a clear increase in their capabilities. This is not 
a totally new change to our capabilities. Johnstone (2007, p. 79) argues that we extended our ability 
to do arithmetic with our fingers before we even developed the calculator, although use of a 
calculator allows us to manipulate much greater numbers than we can in our head or on our fingers. 
For example, a calculator allows individuals to solve mathematical equations easily, if I input “183 
x 54 =” into a calculator I am presented instantly with the answer “9,882”, without any serious 
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mental load on my part. I only need to know which buttons to press. Similarly, computer programs, 
such as Wolfram Alpha, a computational knowledge engine, allow individuals to obtain the answers 
to many complex problems without even knowing the formula needed. For example, typing “what 
is the diameter of a circle with a circumference of 98.7cm” into Wolfram Alpha instantly yields not 
only the answer “31.42cm”, but it also gives other information such as the circles radius and area. 
The ability to use technology such as Wolfram Alpha, or even a calculator, enhances individuals' 
cognitive abilities by assisting them to solve problems.  
 
Deliberately inputting any information is likely to become unnecessary in the future as our use of 
the internet further increases. For example, with Google Glass, or direct computer-brain interfaces, 
it seems likely that an individual could simply look at a circle or equation and immediately be 
presented with the solution, and all the relevant information. This is obviously an increased ability 
compared to a human’s natural ability, or even that of someone with the required maths skills. Being 
able to determine the solutions to these equations provides individuals with a great deal of useful 
information, however, having to calculate the answers manually requires years of schooling and 
even with the necessary skills it takes significant time and mental load to calculate the answers 
manually. The ability to use a calculator, or computer program, to assist an individual in solving 
these equations means that they can direct their mental load elsewhere, saving time and effort while 
obtaining accurate results.  
 
Humans develop technology because it extends or expands our capabilities. Capabilities are open to 
change, they change as we grow and develop, but also as we are educated or use technology. We 
have already enhanced our capabilities through the use of technology, and we can be expected to 
continue to develop technology that alters what we are able to do. Future HET, like many existing 
technologies, will change what people are capable of; this is their purpose, why they were 
developed in the first place. Capabilities changing is an essential aspect of the capabilities approach, 
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and changing what people are capable of is an essential aspect of most technological developments, 
now, and in the future. Therefore, HET can be seen to alter humans’ capabilities in a variety of 
ways. HET can increase individuals’ abilities to achieve within a sphere of functioning by raising 
the maximum level to which the functioning can be achieved. Access to HET can greatly influence 
what individuals are capable of, therefore, it is reasonable to assess the application of the 
capabilities approach to states regulation of HET in order to prevent harmful inequality.  
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Chapter 4: HET and State Provision 
 
HET do more than alter individuals' capabilities, they also change what individuals must be able to 
do in order to fully function in society. Individuals who can achieve all of the capabilities on 
Nussbaum's list of central capabilities should have everything required to pursue the lives they have 
reason to value and fully function as citizens. However, as technology changes the level to which 
these central capabilities can be achieved individuals becomes more reliant on these technologies to 
achieve their basic entitlements and be equal to others. In this way many HETs become essential to 
individuals' abilities to achieve the central capabilities to which they are entitled. 
 
The central capabilities on Nussbaum's list are those that she argues are necessary for a life of 
human dignity, a life of value equal to that of all other humans (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 286). An 
individual, from any background or culture, who is able to achieve all of the central capabilities, 
will be able to pursue the life he has reason to value (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 286). Ensuring the 
capabilities on this list should be of central importance to the state as having these capabilities is an 
individual's basic entitlement. Therefore, in order to be considered just, a state must ensure its 
citizens are sufficiently able to achieve the central capabilities (those on Nussbaum’s list), to ensure 
its citizens can function fully and equally as humans (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 36). What an individual 
needs to be able to do to function fully as a citizen varies between times and locations as technology 
and societies change. Thus, these changes also alter what a just state is required to ensure for its 
citizens. Central capabilities are those required for an individual to be a fully functioning member of 
society, and when the capabilities required to be a fully functioning member of society changes, so 
too does an individual’s entitlement. Technology can change what is required for an individual to be 
considered equal to others, and for him to have the freedom to live the life he has reason to value.  
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HET have the potential to change human capabilities in a meaningful way; they can alter what it 
means for an individual to be a fully functioning member of society, and, thus, change what a just 
state is required to ensure to its citizens to secure their basic entitlements. For example, literacy has 
become so essential to an individual functioning in the developed world that illiterate individuals 
have significantly fewer opportunities than those who are literate. In our society, individuals must 
be able to read and write to get a job, secure housing, or communicate effectively with others. 
Literacy is clearly central to an individual’s ability to function fully as a citizen2. The ability to 
communicate individual’s possess from birth is far less advanced than that which can be obtained 
through formal education in the use of languages. In this way, education in literacy can be 
considered an enhancement technology that alters a central capability individuals require to function 
in society, and, in turn, it must be ensured by a just state. Literacy has clearly changed what people 
are capable of, it has changed a central capability, and, thus, literacy is now a basic entitlement that 
all humans in developed states should have access to.  
 
Similar changes have been caused by many other HETs throughout human history. For example, 
many HETs extend human life, and changes from these technologies alter human entitlements. Life 
expectancy rose greatly between 1950 and 2010, with global life expectancy reaching 68 years, a 
21-year rise (Kondro, 2010, p. 342). Some theorists argue that in the future individuals will live 
longer, healthier, lives past 100, 200, or even 500 years due to developments in technology (Juengst 
et al, 2003, p. 28). These life extension technologies are constantly changing what it means to have 
the capability of living a life of normal length as they alter what it means for a life to be normal 
human length, and this can be expected to continue into the future. This is a clear example of how a 
HET has altered humans’ central capabilities, and will continue to do so in the future. Individuals 
who lack the ability to live a life of similar length to others are likely to have less ability to succeed 
                                         
2 Although an illiterate individual may be able to achieve these things they require significant support from those who 
are literate, and, therefore, literacy is still essential for achieving these things – although an individual may not need 
to possess it himself if he can get help from another.  
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in society, for example they may be less able to pursue long-term career opportunities, or make the 
same family commitments, such as being married or around to support their children for as long, as 
others. Similarly, someone who could live a much longer life than others would have a much greater 
chance to succeed, and pursue the life they have reason to value. The capability for life and bodily 
health is essential to Nussbaum's list of central capabilities, and, thus, it seems clear that this is 
another example of a HET altering the central capabilities to which humans are entitled. The new 
life expectancy now becomes what individuals are entitled to, because the level of the central 
capability required to function fully in society, which we are entitled to, has changed, and, therefore, 
what a just state must ensure has also changed. 
 
Because HETs can alter the central capabilities, to which all humans are entitled, they can also alter 
what a just state is required to ensure for its citizens. Education and formal language have greatly 
extended what can be expected from an individual in terms of her capability to communicate 
effectively with others. Similarly, life extension technologies have changed what it means for an 
individual to live a life of normal human length. Under the capabilities approach, for a state to be 
just it must actively ensure that its citizens have all the capabilities that are necessary to live lives of 
human dignity and respect, to fully participate as citizens and pursue the lives they have reason to 
value. Ensuring the central capabilities does not simply require a state to refrain from acting in a 
way that prevents its citizens achieving them, but, rather, it requires the state to act to actively 
ensure its citizens have everything required, internally, and externally, to achieve these functioning 
(Nussbaum, 1997, p. 190). Therefore, if a HET is necessary for an individual to achieve a central 
functioning to the level that can reasonably be expected for the state to ensure then the state is 
required to ensure the individual has access to this HET.  
 
Nussbaum (1997, p. 290) focuses on a state’s responsibility to ensure what she calls combined 
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capabilities, that is, the right internal states combined with appropriate external conditions that 
allow a person to achieve the functioning. However, this does not mean that she argues states are 
not equally required to also ensure an individual’s internal capabilities. Appropriate external 
conditions and internal capabilities are equally important for individuals to be able to achieve 
combined capabilities. Even if a state secures individuals' rights to speak openly and freely without 
fear of persecution, this right is irrelevant without the internal capability to speak, or otherwise 
communicate effectively. Internal capabilities are those most relevant to discussions of HET, as 
HET alter what individuals are able to do. Thus, although Nussbaum argues that state policy should 
equally be aimed at ensuring the appropriate external conditions, in discussions of HET, considering 
the role of the state with regard to internal capabilities is much more relevant. For example, while 
Nussbaum focuses on the state's responsibility to ensure the appropriate external conditions for 
individuals to speak freely I focus more on the state's responsibility to ensure the means of 
speaking. This includes ensuring technologies such as education or the internet, as these are key to 
an individual’s ability to communicate freely, alongside the appropriate external conditions that 
primarily concern Nussbaum.  
 
It is the state's responsibility to ensure that both external conditions and internal capabilities are 
appropriate for individuals to be able to achieve the central capabilities they are entitled to. This 
means that an individual must have the physical and mental ability to achieve this capability, if it is 
reasonably possible, as well as the conditions in the external world being appropriate too. A focus 
simply on the external conditions would ignore some important differences between individuals. In 
the same way that providing all individuals with the same resources would not allow them to 
achieve the same valuable ends, simply ensuring that individuals live in the same external 
conditions is not sufficient to ensure that individuals are able to achieve the central capabilities. 
Differences between two individuals may mean that even if they are both in a society where the 
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right to free speech is protected, they may not both truly have the capability for speech. For 
example, if one is deaf or has a speech impediment she will have less capability for communication, 
if the state has not also focused on her internal capability, her ability to speak. My focus is not 
separate from Nussbaum's, as her interest in combined capabilities means that she is concerned both 
with the internal capabilities and with appropriate external conditions. However, my focus is almost 
solely on individuals internal capabilities (although I do acknowledge the importance of appropriate 
external conditions) as internal capabilities are those that are most directly influenced by HET. 
 
HET changes individuals’ potential for internal capabilities, and, thus, changes the state's 
responsibilities and requirements to fully ensure its citizens their central capabilities. In order to 
prevent harmful enhancement inequality it is the state’s responsibility to ensure its citizens have the 
central capabilities to which they are entitled. The development of HET has seen some technologies 
become essential for an individual to function adequately in society. However, just as not all 
capabilities are essential to an individual’s ability to function as a citizen, not all HETs are essential 
either, and only those that are essential must be ensured for a state to be just under the capabilities 
approach. By considering which HETs are essential for the central capabilities, those that allow an 
individual to fully function as a citizen and pursue the life they have reason to value, we can 
determine which HETs a just state must ensure to protect its citizens from harm and ensure their 
well-being.  
 
The capabilities approach can also help determine to what level the capabilities must be ensured, 
and, therefore, specifically which HET must be ensured. Many HETs extend the level to which a 
capability can be achieved, however, it may not be necessary for an individual to function to this 
level, and, thus, a state would not be required to ensure this HET. Although all central capabilities 
must be ensured to all individuals, to fully function as a citizen an individual may not need to 
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achieve all of these capabilities to the maximum possible level. A HET may only increase an 
individual's ability to achieve a capability to levels above those required to function as a citizen. In 
this situation, the state would not be expected to ensure their citizens the HET, even though it 
altered their ability to achieve a central capability, as it did not do so in a way that caused those 
without access to be less able to function as citizens and achieve the life they have reason to value. 
It is unrealistic to expect all states to ensure all central capabilities to their citizens to the highest 
possible level, and, if judged this way, many, if not all, states would fail to be considered just. 
Although it may be possible for an individual to have a capability to a very high level, it may not be 
necessary for the state to aim to ensure this level to its citizens if they do not need to achieve the 
capability to this level to fully function. 
 
For example, the capability of life can be achieved to many different levels, and it would be 
ridiculous to judge a state on its success at ensuring all of its citizens lived as long as the oldest 
recorded person. This is not what is required for a just state to ensure its citizens the capability of 
life; for a state to be considered just it must ensure its citizens live as long as reasonably possible. 
This does not mean providing everyone with the same health care, as individual differences and 
luck mean that to achieve the same outcome individuals require different resources. It also does not 
mean that a state has failed at being just if, despite its best efforts, an individual dies of cancer at 
age 12, without having the capability to live a life of normal human length. Nor does it mean that a 
just state may remove medical treatment from an individual against her will once she has reached a 
certain age, determined as that of a normal life. Rather, it means that a state should do what it 
reasonably can to ensure the life of its citizens, which includes ensuring any necessary HET are 
available to its citizens. For a state to be considered just it should, if it has the ability, extend human 
life as much as it reasonably can, providing that staying alive and the use of the technology are 
wanted by the individual.  
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To summarise, with the development of technology humans' abilities are changing, for example, 
variations in technology between times and locations means that the capability for a life of 'normal 
human length' is constantly changing, and, thus, what states must ensure varies depending on the 
medical technology available at that time and location. States must provide HET in the form of 
medical technology for the purposes of ensuring their citizens' capabilities for life, they must do this 
to the highest level that is reasonably possible for that state. What this level is will vary between 
different states even within a specific time. A wealthy state with a large quantity of resources to 
direct towards health care can be expected to ensure the capability of life to a much higher level 
than a poor state with only minimal resources. If both of these states manage to ensure life to the 
same level the poor state may be considered to be doing very well, while the wealthy state could be 
considered to be unjust due to failing to ensure this essential capability to the maximum level it is 
reasonably able.  
 
Due to the changes to central capabilities expected from HET, states will be required to ensure their 
citizens have access to some of these technologies in order to ensure they can achieve the 
capabilities they are entitled to under the capabilities approach. In order to be considered just states 
need not ensure all HET, or even all those necessary for the central capabilities. However, they must 
ensure the centrally important capabilities (those included on Nussbaum's list) to their citizens to 
the best of their ability to ensure that their citizens are at least minimally able to function in society 
as equals, at times this will require ensuring relevant HET. What it means to sufficiently ensure a 
capability will vary between states due to their differing circumstances, therefore, even if one state 
can be expected to ensure a specific HET this does not necessarily mean that another state should be 
expected to do the same. Simply because a HET increases a central capability does not mean that all 
states must ensure it to be considered just, but it does require those states that are reasonably able to 
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ensure it for their citizens if it is required for them to sufficiently function in society. The 
capabilities approach allows us to judge the justness of a state by considering whether it has 
sufficiently ensured all of its citizens their basic entitlements, the central capabilities. This will 
sometimes require states to ensure their citizens have access to a HET, due to its impact on 
individuals’ central capabilities.  
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Chapter 5: Education 
 
Formal education is necessary for individuals to function in society, it provides many essential skills 
people require, but without state provision it would be unavailable to many. States have a 
responsibility to ensure their citizens have the ability to function in society, and at times this will 
require ensuring they have access to essential HETs. For example, we already expect a just state to 
ensure education to its citizens because it provides individuals with essential skills that are 
necessary for them to have the opportunity for well-being. Without formal education many 
individuals would lack the ability to function productively as citizens, therefore, states must ensure 
formal education is available to all of their citizens in order to mitigate inequality. Education can be 
viewed as an example of a HET that states must ensure if they are to be just.  
 
An enhancement can be defined as something that increases or improves a person's abilities in 
quality, value, or extent. Education provides individuals with new capabilities, such as the ability to 
write. It can also increase the value of these capabilities by providing a wide range of people the 
same ability. For example the ability to read and write increases in value as more individuals also 
have this ability because it allows individuals to communicate with each other in much more 
productive ways. Basic literacy is a valuable skill, based on the fact that others also possess this 
skill. If you are the only literate individual your capability to communicate has not been increased at 
all; at least one other individual would also need this ability for it to be of any use to either of you. 
The benefits of this ability increase as more people become literate as you are now able to 
communicate with a whole range of people. Therefore, education should be considered a human 
enhancement technology as it enhances individuals' opportunities for well-being.  
  
Education provides many skills that would be difficult or impossible for an individual to develop on 
  
43 
 
his own, such as reading, writing, or mathematics. Although a child could develop his own language 
without education, this is not the same as being educated in the predominant language of his society 
as the more common language would allow him to communicate more effectively with others, 
rather than his language which allows him to only communicate with himself. If we consider two 
individuals, one who has been taught how to read and write in the common language of his state 
and another who has not, it is clear that the first individual, who is literate, is more able to 
communicate with others than the illiterate individual. A literate individual has the ability to pursue 
a variety of careers, communicate effectively with others, seek higher education, and gain more 
knowledge, while the illiterate individual is severely restricted in vocational opportunities as well as 
his ability to communicate with others and access information. The literate individual is more able 
to function in central ways than the illiterate individual and, therefore, has greater opportunity for 
well-being, even if he chooses to never utilize this ability.  
 
In the past, any information had to be passed directly from one individual to another through spoken 
word, which had the potential to create a Chinese whispers effect (where meaning is lost through a 
series of small inaccuracies when relaying information between a large group of people). Now, with 
the use of written language, information can be passed accurately over time and space. The ability 
to write allows individuals to pass their thoughts on to others without necessarily being directly in 
front of them, this increases clarity and prevents errors as well as increasing the speed of 
communication over long distances. The ability to read allows individuals to 'hear' what these 
writers have to say without relying on someone speaking the words to them. Without my ability to 
write, and your ability to read, I would be unable to communicate my ideas with you now. I would 
be required to either speak them directly to you, or have someone recite my words from memory to 
you, neither of which seems as effective, or beneficial, as this method of written language. 
Similarly, without the ability to read an individual is unable to read instructions or learn information 
from books. Having these abilities is obviously beneficial and allows individuals much greater 
  
44 
 
communication abilities.  
 
Education takes on many forms, it can involve learning from parents, peers, other humans, other 
animals, or even the environment. Being educated and learning new things is something that 
humans are naturally capable of, we are able to mimic, and learn through conditioning, right from 
birth. Although there are many kinds of education, for the purposes of this example I will be 
considering formal education, that is, an individual receiving systematic instruction with the goal of 
the individual learning a new skill, or improving those they already possess (specifically in schools 
rather than what individuals may learn at home from their parents or family members). Education's 
ability to enhance and increase our capabilities means that it perfectly suits the definition of a HET, 
its purpose is to enhance what we are able to do. For example, education in literacy greatly 
increases our communication abilities, and education can also reduce our mental load by providing 
us with mental software that allows us to complete tasks with less effort (Sandberg and Bostrom, 
2007, p. 208).  
 
Because of its clear benefits education is widely valued and rates of participation are rising across 
western nations, with an estimated 84% of individuals from OECD nations completing upper 
secondary school education, and rates of university education increasing 25% between 1995 and 
2010 (Bessant, 2013, p. 138). Traditionally, educations value, and justification for state provision, 
stems from its ability to produce skilled employees for the labour market, who then go on to earn 
higher incomes, and gain the associated increased living standards, as well as promoting economic 
growth for the whole society (Bessant, 2013, p. 138). For example, in Australia an individual with a 
university degree can expect to earn significantly more than an individual who has failed to 
complete year 12 (Bessant, 2013, p. 141). States are expected to ensure education is available to all 
of their citizens, in order to ensure they all have an equal opportunity to achieve the associated 
economic rewards that in turn promise increased living standards. Because of the essential benefits 
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it provides, basic education is held as a universal human right. Article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) holds that free education, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages, is a human right, and that higher education must also be made available to all 
individuals.  
 
Although provision of education driven by the promise of economic productivity can promote 
instrumental skills it also has the potential to leave behind the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in 
society (Cockerill, 2014, p. 13). Having goods does not necessarily mean an individual will be able 
to achieve the valuable outcomes they are meant to ensure, such as health, social relationships, or 
freedom (Bessant, 2013, p. 142). Ensuring resources is not guaranteed to ensure well-being. 
Although education may be essential for individuals to gain the skills necessary to achieve fulfilling 
employment, the economic rewards associated with this employment are not a sufficient measure of 
well-being and should not be considered sufficient justification for state provision. Therefore, if a 
state's success in ensuring education for its citizens is measured by whether its citizens are able to 
achieve employment in order to purchase essential resources, then a state measured as successful 
may not actually have ensured the well-being of its citizens. Rather, states motivation for ensuring 
education should be due to its necessity for ensuring their citizens have the central capabilities to 
which they are entitled, which at times require education in order to be fully realized. 
 
The capabilities approach, when applied to education, illuminates where the real benefits from 
education lie, that is, in creating opportunities for individuals to achieve well-being, defined as 
achieving certain functionings. This challenges the traditional income generation approach to 
education. Instead of the goals and value of education being seen as income generation or 
employability, the capabilities approach values education for its ability to expand human 
capabilities and allow individuals to lead more worthwhile and free lives (Walker, 2005, p. 104). 
Education is essential for individuals' abilities to achieve well-being. It plays an essential role in 
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developing and expanding capabilities, and expands individuals' opportunities. Education provides 
individuals with some capabilities that they require to develop further capabilities necessary to 
pursue the life of their choice. For example, developing basic, then advanced, maths skills opens a 
range of career possibilities to individuals, which in turn expands the opportunities individuals have 
to pursue the life they have reason to value (Walker, 2005, p. 107-108). Education also teaches 
individuals important values and assists them in forming their identity and determining the kind of 
life they will value, and, therefore, use their capabilities to pursue (Walker, 2005, p. 108). Education 
is essential in order for individuals to develop their central capabilities of practical reason and 
affiliation, to develop a conception of the good, and determine what is meant by the good life they 
have reason to value (Cockerill, 2014, p. 14). Ideally education will equip individuals with many of 
the capabilities necessary to determine, and pursue, the opportunities, and lives, they value (Walker, 
2005, p. 109). These are the reasons that education should truly be valued, rather than under the 
traditional income generation approach that fails to ensure well-being. 
 
Although the value of education is clear under the capabilities approach, without state involvement 
many individuals will lack the ability to achieve these essential benefits from education. Without 
the availability of a formal education system individuals rely on their elders to educate them in the 
skills they will need for participation in society. This means that an individual’s education potential 
is bound by the educational attainment of her elders, generally her parents. For example, if a child’s 
parents lack the skills of literacy it is highly unlikely that the child will be able to attain these skills 
without outside schooling. However, this outside schooling can be costly and, thus, would only be 
available to children of parents with the financial means necessary.  
 
Problems arise when educational attainment is required for an individual to attain the higher paying 
employment that would provide them with the financial means to educate their children. This means 
that parents who are unable to afford to send their children to school are also unlikely to be able to 
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educate them themselves, because if they had the literacy to pass on to their children they would 
likely be able to achieve the higher paying employment it promises, and, in turn, pay for their 
children to attend school. Therefore, without state funded education, the children of poor parents 
can be expected to miss out on the education necessary to pursue better employment, and, therefore, 
will also not be able to afford to educate their own children, who again will be in the same position 
as their parents before them. On the other hand, the parents who are educated can afford to send 
their children to school, who can then expect to attain the benefits education promises, and go on to 
educate their own children. The expected result is a nearly inescapable cycle of inequality, children 
of wealthy parents will become educated and have the opportunity to achieve high paying positions, 
while children of poor parents will lack these opportunities, through no fault of their own 
perpetuating the cycle of inequality.  
 
Therefore, a lack of state funded education leads to inescapable inequality, with hardly any chance 
of social mobility as the poor lack the basic skills that an education would provide and are 
necessary to move out of poverty. If education is only available to those who can afford it by their 
own means, or that of their parents, there will be some individuals who miss out, due to luck of 
birth. Some children will grow up lacking basic skills as they were born to parents who could not 
afford the necessary education. This will greatly hamper their ability to live lives equal to that of 
other citizens as they lack the necessary skills to compete in the employment market.  
 
An adequate education promises the possibility of a better income, more job options, and the 
possibility of higher education. Although these benefits are only instrumental for achieving well-
being, rather than being viewed as well-being themselves as they are in the traditional model, they 
are an essential aspect of a full human life that a state must ensure in order to be just. Due to the 
essential nature of basic education, citizens require it to make central capabilities a possibility and 
pursue the life they have reason to value. However, if it is left to individuals to ensure it for 
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themselves and their children some will miss out, due to luck of birth. This will cause great harm 
not only to the individuals, but to society itself due to increased inequality. Therefore, states must 
act to ensure all of their citizens are able to attain basic educational achievement and access the 
capabilities that are essential to their lives as humans in society. At least some education is crucial 
for all humans under the capability approach due to its necessity for individuals to be able to fully 
function as members of society and pursue the lives they have reason to value with dignity equal to 
that of other humans.  
 
Education is clearly a HET, it obviously changes what people are capable of. It is essential for 
individuals to gain the skills required to fully function as citizens in most societies and achieve their 
central capabilities. However, if access to education is left within the free-market, great inescapable 
inequality will rule. In order to avoid this harmful inequality, states are required to ensure their 
citizens have access to education, because basic education allows individuals to achieve many of 
the capabilities central to a life of human dignity equal to that of others. States are already expected 
to ensure their citizens have access to education, and states that fail to do so are unjust under the 
capabilities approach as education is central to an individual's ability to function with human 
dignity and achieve well-being. Therefore, education can clearly be viewed as an example of a HET 
that just states are already expected to ensure in order to secure their citizens the central capabilities 
to which they are entitled. 
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Chapter 6: The Internet 
 
Another technology that hugely increases human capabilities is the internet, its use allows us to 
achieve things that would otherwise be impossible. Although the internet already exists, it is not yet 
widely considered a basic human entitlement that states must ensure if they are to be just. However, 
the internet is a technology that dramatically alters what individuals are capable of, and it may be 
essential for states to ensure it to their citizens if it is necessary for individuals to function 
adequately in those states. If it is necessary for central capabilities, the capabilities approach would 
require states to ensure their citizens have access to the internet. Therefore, this chapter will explore 
whether the internet indeed alters individuals' capabilities in such a way that just states should be 
required to ensure it for their citizens. 
 
The internet is a global network of interconnected computers that holds a variety of information and 
communication facilities that individuals can access through connected devices. Until recently the 
only way for an individual to access the internet was through a desktop computer physically 
plugged into the network. Now, with wireless capabilities, individuals can connect from a range of 
devices almost anywhere. Today many individuals even possess a small computer in the form of a 
'smart phone' that they carry on them at all times and can use to access the internet instantly. New 
and developing technologies will allow individuals even more ubiquitous access to the internet, and 
all the information and communication it allows. For example, Google Glass is a wearable, head-
mounted computer with an optical display that provides the individual who wears it with hands-free 
access to the internet. In the future, devices may be developed that directly link individuals' brains 
with the internet, allowing them to access all it has to offer without the need of an external device; 
such a direct brain-computer interface could allow an individual to access the internet by simply 
thinking about it. As internet connections become more integrated with individuals, the ease of 
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access to all of the associated benefits is constantly expanding. Rather than sitting at a fixed console 
individuals now can access the internet instantly from almost anywhere. 
 
The internet can alter what individuals require to achieve a number of central capabilities. For 
example, the internet has a significant impact on an individual's ability to control her environment, 
both material and political. An individual with access to the internet has a more effective method of 
communication than someone without, they can communicate with a much wider audience and with 
a level of anonymity that seems unachievable elsewhere. Understandably the internet is becoming 
the preferred method for political participation, as well as education, employment, commerce, and 
personal activity (Tully, 2014, p. 176). The internet also increases an individual's ability to control 
her material environment, including by increasing her purchasing power and ability to seek 
employment.  
 
For example, online job applications are becoming mainstream with employers claiming that it 
increases the speed with which they can find a suitable applicant to fill the position (Raman, 2006). 
Online applications also increase opportunities for employees by opening more possibilities of 
seeking employment internationally (Raman, 2006). Access to the internet also increases an 
individual’s purchasing power as he is able to view products available from a huge range of 
suppliers and compare costs from the comfort of his own home. Products purchased online can be 
expected to cost less as the retailer has fewer costs related to physical retail locations or sales staff, 
and there is increased competition between retailers, causing their products to be advertised at more 
competitive prices. Therefore, not only does access to the internet increase an individual's control 
over his political environment by providing improved methods of free speech, but it also increases 
his control over his material environment by allowing greater opportunities to gain employment, 
and, further, increasing his purchasing power from the financial rewards gained through this 
employment. 
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Another central capability that the internet has a significant impact on is affiliation. The ability to 
affiliate, interact socially, as well as assemble and speak freely, to an equal degree as others is an 
important aspect of living a fulfilled human life. Nussbaum's (1997, p. 287) focus on affiliation is in 
terms of individuals having the ability to develop meaningful friendships, as well as the state 
protecting the freedoms of assembly and political speech. Affiliation also includes the social basis 
for self-respect and non-humiliation, and to be treated as a human whose worth is equal to that of 
others (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 287). Clearly, the internet is, at least in current developed nations, 
becoming essential to adequately achieve the capability of affiliation. As I have already established 
the internet is becoming an important tool for free speech, but the internet also allows individuals to 
affiliate and develop meaningful relationships with other individuals. The internet allows 
individuals to be friends with a much larger group of people, and connect with their current friends 
in more ways, such as through social media websites. For example, 73% of online adults use social 
networking, with Facebook being the site of choice (Duggan and Smith, 2013). The ability to use 
these online methods of affiliation clearly contributes to an individual being equally able to achieve 
this central capability, with dignity and respect similar to that of others. 
 
Another capability that Nussbaum (1997, p. 288) argues is central to an individual’s ability to 
function as a human equal to that of others is play. The capability to play involves an individual 
being able to laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities. Similarly to other capabilities, an 
individual needs to be able to achieve this capability to comparable levels to that of others. The 
internet impacts this capability by opening the door to a variety of new ways to play; online games 
are becoming increasingly popular and allow individuals a new means of social interaction or 
personal entertainment. Half of Americans over the age of 6 play video games (ESA, 2005), thus it 
is clearly an important aspect of normal play in current society. This is a further example of how the 
internet is clearly necessary for individuals to participate equally in society and achieve the central 
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capabilities to which they are entitled. 
 
An individual with access to the internet has many more capabilities than she would otherwise 
possess. It increases the control she can hold over her political and material environments while also 
being essential for individuals in developed nations to participate in normal affiliation and play. Due 
to the vast array of benefits it offers it is clear that an individual without access to the internet is 
severely limited compared to an individual who does have access. Due to its ability to enhance what 
humans are able to do it seems clear that the internet is a HET. The internet is currently an external 
device, but in chapter 1 I explained that many HETs are not directly or permanently linked to 
individuals, such as reading glasses, but are nonetheless HET due to their ability to increase or 
improve human abilities. However, if someone remains unconvinced that the internet deserves its 
status as a HET they need only consider a computer chip that if implanted into a brain allowed that 
individual to directly connect his brain with the internet and gain its benefits without actively using 
any external devices. This internet chip would be a fully integrated, non-removable enhancement 
that obviously fits the definition of HET as it increases individuals' capabilities. 
 
As I argued in chapter 4, for a technology to be an entitlement that states must ensure for their 
citizens, that technology must do more than just enhance human capabilities, it must be required for 
the central capabilities that humans are entitled to. This could be the case for the internet. The 
functionings that access to the internet allows individuals to attain are such that, at least in many 
societies, those without the ability to achieve them are less able to function as members of society.  
An individual without access to the internet cannot obtain information or communicate as a fully 
participating citizen in society, nor is she able to participate in everyday activities as an equal 
citizen (Tully, 2014, p. 177). This is exactly the kind of inequality the capabilities approach is 
designed to prevent, and, thus, states may need to seriously consider the internet's position as an 
entitlement.  
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Clearly, the internet is necessary for a range of central capabilities that all humans have an 
entitlement to. However, this does not necessarily mean that a state is unjust if they have not 
ensured their citizens have access to the internet. Although capabilities can be achieved to a variety 
of levels, states are not required to ensure their citizens can achieve all capabilities to the maximum 
possible level to be considered minimally just. Rather, the capabilities approach only requires the 
state to ensure them to the highest level reasonably possible (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 27). This could 
make it difficult to judge the justness of a state as it could claim it was ensuring a capability to the 
best of its ability while only allowing citizens to achieve this capability to a relatively low level that 
did not allow its citizens to actually achieve much in the way of functionings. However, as 
discussed in chapter 2, the intention of the capabilities approach's requirement of justice is to ensure 
a state is just by requiring it to ensure the central capabilities to at least a minimum level that allows 
individuals to participate equally and adequately in society. In the case of the internet this would 
require some states to ensure it to their citizens as it is essential for individuals to even have a 
chance at functioning adequately as citizens, and achieving the life they have reason to value. 
 
The internet is not a new technology, and I am not arguing that from its very conception it was an 
entitlement of every citizen, I am not even arguing that it is an entitlement of every citizen in every 
country now. Rather, the internet can be seen as resting on the very cusp of entitlement. It could be 
argued that in current western society, for example New Zealand, some degree of internet access 
must be ensured if the state is to be just. Although it may only be at low levels such as availability 
in public libraries, where those who cannot afford their own computer and connection can use this 
valuable service for their basic internet needs. This was declared the case by Estonia in 2000 when 
they determined that internet access was a human right, although the practical entitlement only 
extends to free access in public libraries (Tully, 2014, p. 178). In 2010 Finland also declared that 
broadband internet was a legal right of their citizens, they went further than Estonia however, and 
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vowed that everyone would have a 100Mbps connection by 2015 (BBC News, 2010). The British 
government also agreed that it was important to provide everyone with a broadband connection 
(BBC News, 2010). This clearly shows that there is already widespread support for consideration of 
the internet as an essential technology. 
 
In a future society where internet chips, that allow an individual to directly connect her brain to the 
internet, are common place it may be unacceptable for society's poorest to be forced to access the 
internet only through the public library system. An internet chip would allow users to directly 
connect their brains to the internet, meaning that they would be able to send emails, instant 
message, access information, compute complex equations, and have many other valuable abilities 
instantly without an external device. An individual without access to this internet chip would be at a 
significant disadvantage. Even if she could access the internet through a public library she is likely 
to be unable to function adequately as a citizen as her capabilities would be so significantly less 
than that of an individual with the chip implanted. This change could force countries like Estonia to 
extend their commitment to ensuring the internet is available beyond the library and into the homes, 
and potentially even brains, of individual citizens. 
 
Serious, inescapable, inequality where some individuals are unable to achieve essential capabilities 
is unacceptable. Just states must ensure that their citizens have the capabilities necessary for them to 
fully function as citizens. Some of these capabilities require access to certain technologies and the 
internet is one of them. Without state intervention, access to the internet can be expected to be 
unevenly distributed based on an individual’s ability to pay. This is already the case; although 
internet use is widespread, with the number of internet users worldwide increasing from 10 million 
in 1993 to over 2 billion today, this growth is unequal (Tully, 2014, p. 188). Over 70% of 
inhabitants of developed states are internet users, compared with just over 20% of citizens in 
developing states, and fewer than 10% of individuals in Africa (Tully, 2014, p. 188). Internet access 
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is also concentrated among socio-economic elites within these different states (Tully, 2014, p. 189). 
Inequality of access to the internet is associated with unacceptable inequality of central capabilities 
due to the internet's ability to significantly alter what individuals are capable of. Therefore, although 
internet use is widespread it seems that states may have a further responsibility to ensure its 
availability to all, including their poorest citizens, due to the importance of internet access to 
individuals achieving their basic entitlements as  citizens. 
 
The capabilities approach does not deal in absolutes in terms of state provision, states are required 
to ensure their citizens have the central capabilities to the best of their ability. But, it is intended that 
the central capabilities be ensured to a level that allows all individuals to fully function as citizens 
in that society. This means that because some technology is required for an individual to fully 
function as a citizen, as is becoming the case for the internet, for a state to be just it must ensure this 
technology for its citizens. The internet is a HET that alters individuals’ central capabilities in a way 
that means that those without access are unable to live fully functioning, equal, lives, and, thus, the 
state must ensure all citizens have access to the internet. The conclusion that a just state must ensure 
that its citizens have access to the internet, to a level that allows them to equally function as 
citizens, is another example of how HET can change central capabilities in a way that warrants state 
provision of the technology.  
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Chapter 7: Life Extension 
 
Life extension technologies (LET) alter how long individuals can expect to live, and, consequently, 
the life span states can be expected to ensure for their citizens. Under the capabilities approach all 
humans have the entitlement to live a life of normal human length. However, 'Normal human 
length' does not refer to average life expectancy; rather, states must ensure that their citizens can 
live as long as reasonably possible. Although individual differences will make it impossible for 
states to justly ensure that all citizens can live the same length of time, they are still required to do 
everything reasonably possible to ensure their citizens' lives are not cut unjustly short. With the 
development of new HETs that can greatly increase individuals' potential life spans the technologies 
that states must ensure to their citizens changes.  
 
LET encompasses all technologies that are aimed at extending the life of humans beyond the 
'normal' range. Most medical treatments can be considered LETs as they are developed with the 
goal of prolonging human life. Further techniques for extending life are constantly being developed. 
For example, researchers are currently developing a custom membrane that would fit over a human 
heart, like a glove, and prevent heart attacks (Gorman, 2014). According to the American Centre for 
Disease control heart disease was the leading cause of death in America in 2010, causing over 
590,000 deaths. A device that could prevent heart attacks and keep hearts beating could allow many 
individuals to live much longer lives (Murphy et al, 2013). Another variety of technologies also fits 
within this category; LETs are being developed that aim to prolong life by reducing the effects of 
ageing, rather than combating a specific disease. For example, a study found that removing the pain 
receptor in mice and roundworms extended their lifespan by about 10%, and it is hoped that similar 
results could be obtained for humans in the future, without the necessity of removing pain receptors 
(WWC, 2014).  
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LETs not only focus on extending human life but also improving the quality of human life. It is 
unlikely that many people would be interested in living to 500 if they would be in a seriously 
deteriorated condition for the majority of this time. If people aged 'normally' until 100 and then 
continued in the condition of a 100 year old today for the next 400 years, this is unlikely to hold 
mass appeal, nor provide the benefits imagined when one considers having one's life extended. 
Because of this, a vast quantity of research is being conducted into extending individuals’ most 
productive years, opening the possibility of an individual living with the vitality of a 20 year old for 
well over 100 years. A recent study on mice claims to have successfully reversed ageing, and the 
researchers are confident in the ability of the same technique to be applied to humans in the future 
(Savastio, 2014). They claim that if the same results could be replicated in humans, it would be like 
a 60 year old feeling similar to, and having the muscle tone and energy of, a 20 year old (Savastio, 
2014). If a technology was developed that allowed an individual to live with the physical and 
mental capacities of a 20 year old for over 100 years, this is likely to give this individual benefits 
over his peers as he would have significantly more time to succeed at his life goals and pursue the 
life he has reason to value.  
 
Regardless of whether living a longer life is a genuine advantage, although it seems that it would 
be, the changes LET can be expected to make to life expectancy make them of specific concern to 
any state, under the capabilities approach. One of the central capabilities is life; for an individual to 
have this capability they must be able to live a life of normal human length, without dying 
prematurely or having their life so reduced that it is not worth living (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 287). 
Living a life of normal human length does not mean that all individuals must live an average life 
span for a state to be just, as this is simply not always possible. Nor does it mean that the state can 
remove medical treatment from an individual once they have reached the age of average lifespan. 
What is required for a state to be just, in terms of ensuring the capability of life, is that it, to the best 
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of its ability, ensures its citizens do not die from something that could reasonably be prevented from 
killing them.  
 
The invention of many healthcare technologies has meant that many conditions that in the past were 
expected to kill you are now easily treated. For example, the development of antibiotics gave 
individuals a greater capability to fight bacterial infections. Prior to the development of antibiotics 
and other modern healthcare techniques, tuberculosis (TB) was almost always fatal, however, the 
fatality rates have dramatically dropped to about 4% as of 2008 (Lawn and Zumla, 2011, p 67). 
Prior to these developments it would not be expected for someone to survive TB, it would not be a 
central capability that someone should have, while today it certainly is. We now have the ability to 
effectively treat TB, and would believe that someone had not been able to adequately achieve their 
capability for life (not dying prematurely) if they had been killed by untreated TB. In the future it is 
likely that an increasing number of diseases and conditions that are currently untreatable will be 
able to be easily combated with new technological developments. A cure or vaccination for HIV or 
a cure for 'old age' could both dramatically alter what would be considered having the capability for 
life. These developments would again change what it means to live a life of normal length. 
Therefore, their development would also alter what a just state is expected to ensure in terms of 
protecting its citizens' entitlement to live a life of normal human length.  
 
Although the central capability of life on Nussbaum's list refers to a life of 'normal human length', 
seemingly talking about average life expectancy, this does not mean states do not need to ensure 
LETs unless they are necessary for a citizen to live a life of average length. They could be required 
even if they are only useful at extending life beyond average length. In 2004 life expectancy in the 
United States was estimated to be 77.8 years, whereas the maximum life span, the highest verified 
age, stood in 2009 at just over 122 years for females and 116 for males (Sierra et al, 2009, p. 458). 
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Life expectancy has increased continually and linearly between 1840 and present, rising about 3 
months per year, or 2.5 years per decade (Sierra et al, 2009, p. 458). But powerful LETs could 
change life spans without changing average life expectancy if they were only availably to a 
minority. The rich elite could extend their own life span without having much of an impact on 
overall life expectancy. If a LET was developed that allowed some individuals to live significantly 
longer, healthier, lives than an average citizen (as only a minority could access them due to their 
prohibitive cost), then this would be expected to create significantly harmful inequalities and force 
the state into action. Therefore, changes from LET do not need to cause changes in average life 
expectancy for the state to be required to ensure them. As discussed in chapter 2, the state must 
ensure individuals' capabilities are such that they allow each individual to fully function as a 
member of society and have the equal ability to pursue the life he has reason to value. This may 
require providing technologies that increase individuals' capabilities beyond the average range if 
extension into this higher level was required for an individual to have an equal chance at competing 
in society, to be able to pursue the life she has reason to value, or hold equal political and social 
power. 
 
Even if LETs only impact the maximum life span of some individuals, this could still significantly 
reduce the capabilities of those without access to this technology. This is because LETs have the 
potential to dramatically alter the structure of our society. They could create a world where the 
family systems and transitions of power we know today are non-existent. For example, if 
individuals with access to LET can expect to live to over 200 years there is no reason for them to let 
go of their positions of power and retire at 65, or even 80. If people start retiring at much older ages, 
this is likely to alter the pacing of promotion with the importance of seniority (Sierra, 2009, p.466), 
and, thus, those without access to LET can expect to miss out on important career opportunities as 
they will lack the ability to achieve the age, and associated experience, necessary to achieve these 
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promotions. An individual who has the kind of hugely extended life expectancy that LET offers can 
obviously achieve more things in his lifetime than an individual with a 'natural' life expectancy, of, 
say, 80. Individuals with extended life expectancies are likely to be able to pursue many more 
careers, and get further within these careers, in their lifetime, and generally have more time to 
pursue lives they have reason to value.  
 
An individual with access to LET has many more capabilities than someone without access, as such 
they can be seen to have a significant advantage over those without access to LET. An individual 
without access to LET would not be equally able to function. He could not be reasonably expected 
to be able to live a life of equal dignity, nor fully function as a citizen, if by the time he reached 80 
years he was resigned to a life of the elderly without the ability to work and with the knowledge that 
he would soon die, when his peers, with access to the technology, have not even reached middle age 
and are only now beginning to start their families and build their careers. This is serious inequality 
that can be expected to be harmful for everyone in society, and it is clearly the job of states to 
ensure all of their citizens have the equal capability to live a life of dignity equal to that of others. 
With the development of powerful LET this will require some states to ensure their citizens have 
access to this technology.  
 
This chapter provides an example of how in the future a HET could create such a huge change in 
individuals’ capabilities that those without access will not have even the slightest chance to compete 
with those who have access. In this case it would be absolutely essential for any remotely just state 
to ensure all of its citizens have access to this technology. The examples covered prior to this 
chapter are technologies that already exist, LET is not significantly different as technologies that 
aim to extend human life have been around for most of human history. LET have huge potential to 
enhance humans' capabilities for life, this chapter specifically focused on the LETs that are aimed 
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not at allowing humans to live a life of normal human length, but rather those that allow individuals 
to live beyond even the maximum length of life humans can currently be expected to achieve. 
Given this, it is clear that the capabilities approach would require states to ensure that their citizens 
can access LET in order to adequately achieve the essential capability of life. However, this chapter 
also gives an example of how, in some cases, states cannot afford to wait until the norm is changed 
to ensure a technology as harm can be caused even when only a minority have access to a 
technology. Therefore, the state must act not simply to ensure its citizens have a 'normal' or 
'average' capability, but to ensure that they are able to achieve all central functionings to a level that 
allows them to fully participate in society and pursue the life they have reason to value with human 
dignity and respect. With the development of LET there is the serious possibility that if access is left 
unregulated in the free market, an individual’s life span could be based on ability to pay. Clearly 
states will need to ensure their citizens have access to these LETs, including before they are 
widespread enough to alter average life expectancy. Although Nussbaum argues that none of the 
central capabilities are more important than the others, the capability of life is the most essential as 
without it none of the others are even possible. LET is important to consider as it is a technology 
that will cause great changes to individuals’ capabilities in a way that will require states to ensure 
this technology to their citizens.  
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Chapter 8: Genetic Modification 
 
The impact of Genetic Modification (GM) on human capabilities and future societies is difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict, but developments in GM may change the requirements of a just state. 
Therefore, GM is an ideal example for considering the ability of the capabilities approach to cope 
with the unpredictable nature of future HETs, and to continue providing constructive policy 
guidelines for any HETs developed in future. 
 
Genetic modification (GM) refers the intentional alteration of an organism’s genes. GM has the 
potential to make humans super strong or hyper intelligent. It could extend all human senses or give 
us new ones. It could make humans glow-in-the-dark or change our basic requirements for life. GM 
even has the potential to create new people who hardly resemble Homo sapiens at all. GM could 
involve combining human genes with those of other animals, or even plants, to create a human with 
an animal's abilities or traits. It could also involve altering human genes in order to give some kind 
of benefit to that human, such as removing vulnerability to a certain condition or disease. With GM, 
no human trait needs to be regarded as essential due to it simply being a 'human' trait. This opens a 
whole new realm of capabilities. No longer are our abilities defined or constrained by our species, 
but, rather, our abilities become almost totally open to change. Clearly GM is a HET due to its 
potential to greatly expand human capabilities. 
 
The ability to select between embryos for traits such as intelligence is already being developed 
(Guilford, 2014), and it hardly seems a leap to imagine developing the ability to genetically modify 
an embryo to create an intelligent child. GM also has the potential to provide individuals with other 
advantages, such as immunity to disorders or diseases, or the ability to regrow limbs like starfish. 
The significant potential changes to our abilities from GM mean that it could allow us to achieve 
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any number of benefits. This could range from simply increasing our current abilities, such as 
through increased intelligence or physical strength, through to providing us with traits that naturally 
only belong to other species. Because the most influential GMs are unlikely to reach the stage of 
being used on humans in the near future, as they are yet to reach even the initial experimental 
stages, and because the variety of outcomes from this technology are so large, it is extremely hard 
to predict what kind of changes may occur to our capabilities. However, we can expect some fairly 
general results, for example we can expect GM to greatly increase many of our already existing 
capabilities, and we can also expect it to allow us to achieve new capabilities.  
 
Just as the genetic changes that may be possible with GM are hard to predict, so too it is hard to 
predict what kinds of capabilities will be necessary, that is, central to human life, in the future. 
Although the ability to glow-in-the-dark or regrow limbs is not necessary for most individuals to be 
able to achieve the central capabilities now, and it may be hard to see how it would be necessary in 
a future society, this is something that is almost impossible to predict. For example, in the past, long 
before written language, it would be impossible to understand why someone would need to be able 
to read or write, let alone have a computer to send emails and talk to others on the other side of the 
planet instantly. However, as I have shown, we certainly need these capabilities now. For the 
capabilities approach to be useful at providing policy recommendations for these future societies, it 
must be able to apply to any possible developments, including ones we are yet unable to predict. 
 
Future societies are hard to predict, but general approaches can transfer to these societies, and, thus, 
we can anticipate in a very general way what states will be required to do in order to be just. Almost 
any of the changes possible through GM or other HET could be essential for an individual to 
function in a future society, and those that are essential will be necessary for a state to ensure to its 
citizens. If it were the case that the ability to glow-in-the-dark was necessary for basic functioning 
as a human in society, then we know from the capabilities approach that a just state must ensure this 
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genetic modification was available to all of its citizens. These basic principles of the capabilities 
approach can apply to all future developments of HET, regardless of how difficult they are to 
predict. If a technology were developed that altered humans' capabilities in any way that changed 
what was necessary for an individual to function fully and equally as a citizen, then a just state 
would be required to ensure this technology to the highest level reasonably possible, regardless of 
what it was or what specific changes it made to human capabilities. On the other hand, the 
capabilities approach can also tell us which technologies are unnecessary for the state to ensure to 
its citizens; if a technology was not necessary for an individual to fully function as a citizen and 
pursue the life he has reason to value, then the state would not be required to ensure its availability, 
no matter what kind of technology it was, or what changes it made to capabilities. 
 
Some HETs, such as GM that significantly alters our genetic structure, may raise the question of 
what it means for someone to be human. The capabilities approach was developed to cope with 
'human' capabilities, but the use of some HETs may make an individual seem other than human, 
and, thus, they may threaten the applicability of the capabilities approach in regards to this 
individual. However, this would not have a serious impact on my conclusions. This thesis uses the 
term 'human' in a broad sense. A definition such as that developed by Martha Nussbaum in her 
discussion of the capabilities approach may suffice. She argues that for the purposes of the 
capabilities approach, a human is anyone who is born to human parents and who has at least a 
minimum level of agency and thought (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25).  
 
This chapter provides an example of a technology with consequences that we are unable to 
accurately predict. We cannot know what kind of GM will be developed in the future, and of those 
that are developed which may become necessary for individuals to achieve their basic entitlements, 
that is, the central capabilities necessary to be a fully functioning member of their society. This 
chapter demonstrates that this is not a problem for the capabilities approach or for my argument that 
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states must ensure some HETs to prevent inequality. If a HET is developed, such as GM, that is 
required for individuals to achieve their central capabilities, and live lives as humans with dignity 
equal to that of others, then for a state to be just it must ensure access to that technology for its 
citizens. It is not the specifics of the technologies in these examples that is important to consider, 
rather, it is important to consider the potential outcomes of these technologies, and their impacts on 
society in general. This is why I propose applying the capabilities approach in the first place, rather 
than judging each technology on a case-by-case basis. The capabilities approach provides us with 
guidelines for what kinds of technologies just states must ensure. It does not require states to ensure 
technologies X, Y, and Z, but, rather, it is a broad approach that covers all possible technologies. 
The capabilities approach argues that in order to be just states must ensure that their citizens are 
able to do certain things. This sometimes requires states to ensure certain technologies are available 
to their citizens, specifically those that are necessary for individuals to achieve their basic 
entitlements, that is, having the ability to achieve certain central capabilities. 
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Chapter 9: Potential Limitations 
 
This chapter considers whether my argument that states should use the capabilities approach to 
guide their regulations aimed at preventing harm from HETs is likely to be successful. It is possible 
that my focus on capabilities to prevent harmful inequality will be ineffective at preventing harm as 
the harm associated with inequality is generally related to resource inequality, which capability 
equality is unlikely to ensure. However, I argue that the common focus on resources is what is truly 
misguided, and that capability equality is more likely to prevent harm than a focus on resources or 
utility. In this chapter I also consider the potential for the capabilities approach to regulate HETs 
that pose harm other than inequality. I argue that the capabilities approach is perfectly suited to cope 
with these kinds of HETs and will likely recommend a variety of regulatory options to prevent harm 
from any HETs, and at times this may include banning some harmful technologies. I also briefly 
consider another potential harm from HETs, that their very development would be harmful. I 
respond to this concern by arguing that the capabilities approach would also be able to regulate the 
development of HETs if applied to such a concern. I conclude that the capabilities approach can be 
expected to successfully and provide valuable regulatory advice to prevent a range of harms from 
HETs, including those posed by inequality as well as the threat of harm from these technologies 
themselves.  
 
Someone could object to my proposal by arguing that ensuring capability equality would not 
prevent the harms associated with inequality as these harms are associated with resource inequality, 
and, thus, as ensuring equality of capabilities would be unlikely to ensure resource equality the 
harm I aimed to prevent would remain. However, although harm from inequality is generally cited 
as correlating with resource inequality, this focus is misguided. Resource equality is only 
instrumental to preventing significant harm as the true harm from inequality is due to inequality of 
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capabilities. Therefore, although resources are instrumental for the goal of preventing harm, 
ensuring equality of resources will not completely solve harmful inequality. To be successful at 
preventing harm, states must focus on ensuring capability equality rather than focusing on resources 
or utility. 
 
Harm from inequality is often attributed to resource inequality, such as differences in individuals’ 
income levels (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2007, p, 1976). However, the capabilities approach was 
developed due to problems with using resources as a measure of equality and well-being. Sen 
(1979, p. 218) argues that when we consider resources we are misguided; what we really want to 
know when we assess whether people have resources is whether they are able to achieve the 
valuable ends that resources are meant to allow them to. If Sen is correct, then when studies show 
that resource inequality is harmful the inequality that is actually harmful is capability inequality, 
which is correlated with resource inequality. There is a correlation between resource equality and 
lower levels of harm because resources are instrumental to individuals achieving central 
capabilities, and being able to achieve central capabilities means individuals can achieve well-
being. This means that, although studies show that individuals in states with high levels of resource 
inequality are more likely to experience a range of negative outcomes, these harms are not due to 
the resource inequality, but, rather, the capability inequality that resource inequality can contribute 
to. If Sen is correct then reducing resource inequality may also reduce harm. However, this 
reduction in harm is due to resources being instrumental to achieving capabilities, rather than 
having resources truly being well-being. Thus, reducing resource inequality would have a positive 
impact on capability inequality. However, states can be expected to be much more successful at 
reducing harm if they directly focus on reducing capability inequality. 
 
Although harmful inequality is often correlated with resources it also has a relationship to how 
individuals feel. At least a proportion of harm seems to come from individuals’ perceptions of their 
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position in society. When a society is more unequal an individual’s position in the hierarchy matters 
more and this leads to increased perceptions of inequality and competition between individuals, in 
turn this also leads to a range of associated negative outcomes, as discussed in chapter 1. It seems 
that the perceived importance of hierarchy would be present regardless of the kind of inequality that 
exists, as long as the inequality can be perceived by the citizens. Although resources may be an 
obvious way for individuals to judge their position we know from the discussion in chapter 2 that 
judging a society on its resource equality is unsuccessful as a measure of justice, and is unlikely to 
prevent harmful inequalities. There is no reason to believe that individuals with equal resources will 
consider themselves equal in the hierarchy of society. Individual differences mean that the same 
resources do not necessarily allow individuals to achieve the same ends, and, thus, having the same 
resources is unlikely to cause individuals to feel equal to others. Therefore, not only is resource 
equality a poor measure for states to use to evaluate potential actions, but ensuring this equality of 
resources is unlikely to cause individuals to feel, or be, equal to others in the social hierarchy.  
 
This is where the capabilities approach provides real benefits in terms of states actual abilities to 
prevent harmful inequality. The capabilities approach recognises the importance of both resources 
and individuals perceptions, however it does not require states to focus on these measures directly. 
Rather, the capabilities approach argues that states will be most successful at preventing harm if 
they focus on capabilities directly. Even if this focus will not completely solve harmful inequality it 
is still the most likely method to prevent harm. Although Sen would argue that two individuals with 
the same capabilities, but differing resources, should consider themselves as equals it is unclear that 
they actually would. An individual’s perception of their own position, and that of others, is not 
necessarily an accurate reflection of society. This problem is no different to that discussed in 
capabilities theorist’s discussions of utility as a measure of equality. How people feel about what 
they have is not a good measure for states to use for determining their requirements; individuals' 
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perceptions of their requirements are not necessarily a good measure of their requirements, and, 
therefore, a perfectly acceptable state can be seen as negative by the citizens, or an unjust state 
judged as positive, if individuals’ perceptions are the judge. Thus, using this as a measure is not 
practical, nor is it good at producing a just result.  
 
Even if ensuring equality of capabilities will not remove all perceived inequalities this does not 
mean that it is not a valuable goal. For some injustices we must simply accept them as there is 
nothing we can do about them. The state cannot completely control how individuals perceive their 
position in society, if individuals have all the same central capabilities then the state has done as 
much as required to remove inequality. Although negative outcomes are associated with individuals 
perceptions of a strong hierarchy within their society, this is not something that can be completely 
solved by a just state as it would require them to undertake unjust actions, such as by providing 
more to some simply because they feel that they have less, when this is not actually the case, while 
potentially also removing the little some have if they feel it puts them above others. These actions 
would clearly not be just, therefore, the state should focus its actions on ensuring its citizens basic 
entitlements, central capabilities, not directly on altering its citizens’ perceptions or utility. There is 
an independent measure of what it is for two individuals to be equal, as far as the state is concerned, 
that is that they can both achieve their central capabilities and lead the lives they have reason to 
value.  Whether these individuals perceive these circumstances as equal or not is not the concern of 
the state as a focus on how individuals feel is unlikely to lead to a just result. 
 
Ensuring equality of capabilities is unlikely to mean ensuring equality of resources or perceptions of 
social position. Differences between individuals mean that it is impossible for equality of resources 
to produce equality of outcomes and solve the harms of inequality. Even if resources are necessary 
they are only a means to the valuable end of actual equality that a focus on capabilities will more 
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successfully ensure. It is also unrealistic to judge a state on their ability to ensure all individuals are 
equally happy or have similar levels of utility, individual differences mean that two individuals 
equally able to achieve the life they have reason to value can feel significantly different about their 
positions. One individual who is seriously unable to achieve central functionings may be perfectly 
happy with his deprived life, while another individual who is able to achieve the life she has reason 
to value may still be unhappy with her arguably totally acceptable life. Neither resources nor utility 
are acceptable measures of state action in terms of preventing harmful inequality. This is precisely 
the reason the capabilities approach was developed, as a practical replacement for other measures of 
justice. The evidence that inequality is harmful may focus on resources or utility but this focus is 
misguided, the actual harm from inequality comes from individuals having differing capabilities 
and solving this inequality can be expected to solve harm from inequality to the greatest degree a 
state can be reasonably expected to.  
 
An additional issue for the potential of the capabilities approach to prevent harmful inequality can 
be seen with the difficulties posed by the importance of personal responsibility. For example, the 
states responsibility to individuals who choose to not accept a technology, even if it is offered free 
of charge by the state. In theory, if a HET was necessary for an individual to fully function as a 
citizen and the state made it available to all of its citizens, so that they all had the ability to function 
fully as citizens, and pursue the life they had reason to value, then the state would have succeeded 
in fulfilling its responsibilities, even if some individuals chose to not utilize the technology and 
achieve the functioning. If using this technology made individuals able to achieve the central 
capabilities, the individuals who choose to not accept the technology would not be able to fully 
function as citizens and achieve well-being. However, like the fasting man this may not be a 
problem for the state as they should not force individuals into achieving functionings but rather 
should ensure that all of their citizens have the ability to choose to achieve the central capabilities. 
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By ensuring the technology is available it may initially seem that the state has done everything 
required to allow its citizens to have this choice.  
 
For example, if a LET was developed that allowed almost anyone to live significantly over 200 
years, with minimal risks and maintaining youthful stamina and health for the majority of this time, 
as discussed earlier in the thesis, the state would be required to ensure this technology was available 
to all of their citizens, so that they could all achieve the central capability of life. However, a portion 
of the population may find themselves opposed to this technology, for religious, moral, or personal 
reasons. Individuals would be unable to fully achieve the capability of life without accepting the 
LET, however, the state, by ensuring the technology is available to everyone, has made this 
capability open to all of its citizens. Thus, as in the case of the fasting man (who chose not to eat 
even though nourishing food was provided for him), it would seem that this was not a concern for 
the state as the individuals who reject the technology are making this choice freely, based on their 
conception of the good life, and the state’s only responsibility is to allow its citizens to make this 
choice, not to force them to choose one way or another.  
 
However, simply ensuring the technology is available may not be sufficient for the state to fulfil its 
responsibilities. The abilities made possible by this LET would also be necessary for other central 
capabilities, and, thus, the person rejecting the LET would not only be rejecting the capability for 
life but also the capability of control over one's environment, as they would be unable to attain 
desirable employment or have similar control over the political environment as others due to their 
significantly shorter life span. Now the question becomes slightly more complex, should an 
individual's choice to not achieve one capability remove his choice to achieve other capabilities? If 
this were the case could the state still be considered equal and just?  
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Consider again the individual choosing to fast, if she starves until she is so malnourished that she is 
unable to achieve any other capabilities, is this still a just situation where the state has no further 
responsibility to her than ensuring food is available? If this choice is freely made it does not seem to 
be a problem for the state as she is freely choosing to fast. An individual could freely choose to 
reject all of the central capabilities, and the state would still be considered just, if the individual had 
the ability to achieve them and the choice was freely made. However, the state must investigate the 
barriers that are preventing someone from achieving the central capabilities they are entitled to. 
Although it may initially seem that the choice to not achieve these capabilities was freely made this 
may not be the case, and the state must investigate this and actively work to remove the barriers that 
were preventing the individual from achieving the capability. In the example of the fasting person, it 
may be that the reason she chooses to fast is that the only means of nourishment offered to her is 
animal meat and she is morally opposed to the consumption of animal products, and, thus, the state 
would not be doing everything reasonably possible to ensure she has the capability to be fully 
nourished if it did not ensure she has access to other forms of sustenance. Therefore, if it is able the 
state must do more to ensure that the individual can freely choose to achieve the capability.  
 
In the case of the individuals rejecting LET, their moral (or similar) opposition to the technology 
may mean that, similar to the vegetarian fasting person, their choice to reject this technology and 
the capabilities it offers is not truly freely made. In order to protect these individuals' capabilities to 
the best of its ability it seems the state would be required to do more than simply offer a technology 
that the individuals are morally opposed to, as then these individuals would not be able to maintain 
a life of dignity and respect no matter their choice to accept or reject the technology. If they reject 
the technology they are likely to be bound to a life of poverty, without the ability to attain 
employment that would give them the opportunity to control their material environment, they may 
be reduced to begging for food and shelter if no other support is offered. This is clearly unjust. 
However the alternative, that they accept the technology and can gain employment would also be 
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unjust as the individual would lack self-respect by taking an action that they consider to be morally 
objectionable. These individuals cannot make a free or dignified decision to either accept or reject 
the technology, and, thus, it seems clear that the state must have some further responsibility to them. 
It may be impossible for the state to allow them to live as long as others who accept the technology, 
however, this does not mean that it can neglect their other capabilities. The state must consider the 
barriers that are preventing its citizens from fully functioning as citizens, living the life they have 
reason to value with dignity and respect equal to that of others, and take active steps to deconstruct 
these barriers.  
 
In the case of LET, simply ensuring the technology does not seem to be sufficient to account for the 
individual differences and values that are so essential to the capabilities approach. The capabilities 
approach aims to ensure anyone with all kinds of values and beliefs can achieve the capabilities 
necessary for a life of human dignity and respect, and, clearly, simply making technology available 
is not sufficient to mitigate the potential harms of enhancement inequality. If an individual is forced 
to choose between two equally undesirable options they can hardly be seen as making a free choice, 
and the state must ensure they have alternative options that are acceptable. This will require more 
than simply making technology available to all. Exactly what this extra help would look like is an 
important consideration for future research. The literature would benefit from examination of what 
else a state must do, other than simply ensuring necessary HET are available, to be just and secure 
the central capabilities to its citizens while preventing harmful inequality.  
 
Another consideration for state regulation is the serious potential for HET to have harmful 
consequences. While throughout this thesis I have promoted the potential benefits of these 
technologies, they also have the potential to cause harm. For example, George Annas (2010, p. 309) 
is concerned that if a new or 'better' group of humans was created through genetic modification that 
this could lead to genocide. He is concerned that if substantial changes were made to some people 
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then they would be seen as separate, other, and that the unenhanced would be viewed as 'lesser' 
humans. His concern is that that it may be seen as acceptable to slaughter or subjugate these 'lesser' 
humans (Annas, 2010, p. 320). Annas (2010, p. 323) even goes so far as to consider genetic 
engineering, cloning, human-machine cyborgs, xenografts, and brain alternations as 'crimes against 
humanity', potentially even an act of terrorism, as he argues that they threaten the integrity of the 
human species itself.  
 
However, attempting to prevent these possible harms by banning HETs is unlikely to be a 
productive solution. As I argued in Swindells (2014), an outright ban on HET is unlikely to prevent 
their development and will only serve to further restrict access from the poor, increasing inequality 
and the development of two classes of humans. Whereas, if access to HET is supported by the state 
and all individuals have the opportunity to become enhanced and join this group of 'better' humans 
the differences between these groups are likely to become significantly less important. However, as 
discussed earlier, some individuals can be expected to reject these enhancements and remain 
unenhanced, and, therefore, simply ensuring the technology is available may not be enough to save 
the moral equality that will protect us from the genocide Annas fears. It is up to the state to ensure 
all, including those who reject HET, retain their central capabilities, including being protected from 
harm and persecution by others. The state must not forget the horrors of the past and must protect 
all groups from persecution by another. This will require the state to act to mitigate the differences 
between these groups and to protect any group from attack by another, no matter how separate or 
'non-human' they perceive that group to be. 
 
Further, if the essential equality of humans cannot be ensured, or other serious harms be prevented, 
in a society that allows these technologies then under the capabilities approach they would not be 
acceptable. The central goal of the capabilities approach is to ensure that all individuals can achieve 
their basic entitlements. Although I have generally spoken about this in terms of the state providing 
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something to make this possible, it is also possible that to ensure these capabilities the state must 
restrict the liberties of some, such as by banning access to certain technologies. The capabilities 
approach allows states to develop a variety of conclusions and policies to best prevent harm and 
ensure the equality and entitlements of their citizens. I maintain that an outright ban would be 
ineffective, however, I do acknowledge that in some circumstances it may be the state’s best option 
to prevent harmful inequality, or even genocide.  
 
Some HETs (e.g. gun implants) would obviously be banned under the capabilities approach, as 
ensuring they were available to all might prevent inequality but would not prevent their other 
harmful consequences. Enhancements that increase individuals’ abilities to harm others, by 
allowing those using these enhancements to threaten the capabilities of others, would not be 
acceptable under the capabilities approach. If a weapon implant were developed that increased an 
individual’s ability to control others with force this would pose unacceptable risks to individuals’ 
capabilities, such as the capability of bodily integrity which includes the ability to be free from 
violent assault. Although states providing this technology to all of their citizens would reduce 
inequality, as then not only the rich would be weaponized, this would clearly not be the best way to 
prevent the harm posed by this technology. Rather, gun implants, or other similar enhancements, 
would require an alternative regulatory action under the capabilities approach. It seems likely that 
the best way for states to prevent the harm associated with such a technology is through banning it 
to prevent all of their citizens from accessing it. Even if such a ban were not totally successful this 
would not make aiming to enforce it an undesirable goal. 
 
In these cases, that require other regulatory action, it is not that the capabilities approach has failed 
to ensure a just result, rather, the capabilities approach has shown its true strength. That is, that the 
capabilities approach can allow states to know the best action to take to ensure the well-being of 
their citizens, to fulfil their basic requirements. This means that although I argue that ensuring 
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technology is likely to be the best method to regulate and prevent harm from most HET, the 
capabilities approach would not require a state to ensure, or even allow, a harmful technology. Thus, 
at times the capabilities approach would recommend an alternative regulatory action. The 
capabilities approach can be used to assess the likely outcomes of any technology that is developed 
and provide policy advice to best ensure individuals' entitlements and well-being are protected. 
Policies to achieve this goal are likely to come in a range of forms from banning some technologies, 
while others require no regulatory action at all. However, I argue that, in most cases, because HET 
are developed for the benefit of humans and will cause significant changes in what an individual 
needs to be able to do to be an equal citizen, the state will be required to ensure these technologies 
are available to all, to ensure their benefits are equally dispersed and prevent harmful inequality. 
 
Finally, this thesis focuses on the issue of access to developed, and presumably safe, HETs. 
However, the capabilities approach is also likely to be a useful tool for determining potential harms 
associated with the development and testing of HET. For example, an experiment or human trial 
that would unjustly reduce an individual's central capabilities would not be acceptable under the 
approach, and, thus, under the capabilities approach governing bodies would be required to prevent 
such an experiment. Future research would benefit from consideration of the applicability of the 
capabilities approach to further regulatory issues surrounding HET. 
 
Although these concerns are important to consider, they pose no threat to my claim that states 
should use the capabilities approach to guide regulation of HETs to prevent harm. Ensuring 
capability equality may not ensure resource equality or make individuals feel equal in the social 
hierarchy. However, the capabilities approach can be expected to be a more successful guide for 
state policy to prevent harm than these alternatives. The capabilities approach is also well suited to 
prevent harm from HETs themselves, such as that posed by enhancements that threaten individuals’ 
central capabilities. In these cases the capabilities approach clearly shows that some enhancements 
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are truly harmful and may need to be banned in order to prevent harm, specifically when the harm 
does not primarily come from inequality and would not be solved by ensuring these technologies 
are available to all. It seems that the capabilities approach can also successfully be used to regulate 
other areas of enhancement technologies, such as their development. Overall, the capabilities 
approach is able to be applied to the regulation of HET and provide realistic policy advice that can 
be expected to ensure the state prevents harm and fulfils its requirements to the highest possible 
level. The capabilities approach has proven to be a valuable regulatory tool to prevent harm and 
ensure justice due to its ability to apply to any possible technologies and recommend a range of 
appropriate regulations to best ensure just results.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
This thesis rose from a problem identified in Swindells (2014); human enhancement technologies 
(HET) are being developed that will greatly change what people are able to do, and this can be 
expected to cause great inescapable inequality if access is left unregulated. Further, this inequality 
can be expected to cause significant harm to everyone, not just the poor who immediately seem 
worst off. Therefore, it is in everyone's best interests for states to act to mitigate this inequality. I 
concluded in Swindells (2014) that states acting to ensure HET to their citizens would have the best 
chance of retaining the benefits while preventing harmful inequality. However, it would be 
unrealistic to expect all states to ensure all HET to all of their citizens in order to prevent harmful 
enhancement inequality. Clearly some of these technologies will be unnecessary, or unrealistic for 
states to ensure. Therefore, it must be determined which HETs a just state must ensure to prevent 
inequality. In order to effectively do this the state must have a framework or guideline for 
evaluating HETs that allows them to easily determine what regulatory action to take to best ensure 
justice and prevent harm.  
 
In this thesis I proposed that the capabilities approach could be applied in order to determine which 
HETs a state must ensure in order to be just. The capabilities approach was developed as a means to 
assess the justness of a state by determining whether it ensures its citizens have equality of what it 
calls 'central capabilities'. Under the capabilities approach a state is just if it ensures its citizens have 
access to the HETs necessary for the central capabilities. That is, the HETs necessary for an 
individual to fully function as a citizen, with dignity equal to that of all other humans. For my 
proposal to be acceptable, first some HETs must be necessary for the central capabilities, and, 
secondly, a state ensuring these capabilities must be able to prevent harmful enhancement 
inequality. I argued that clearly some HETs can alter capabilities, this is essentially their only 
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purpose, and, further, this change in capabilities is such that it requires states to ensure these 
technologies to their citizens. Clearly some HETs are able to alter what an individual must be able 
to do in order to fully function as a citizen, and, thus, the state must ensure these technologies are 
available to their citizens to achieve their basic entitlements. My examples showed how, not only 
does the capabilities approach require states to ensure some already existing technologies, but, it 
will also easily determine which future HETs must be ensured by a just state.  
 
My proposal of the use of the capabilities approach to guide state action can be defended against a 
range of potential criticisms. Someone may argue that my focus on capabilities would not solve 
harmful inequality as the harm is due to resource inequality. However, inequality of resources is 
harmful because it contributes to capability inequality. Thus, the capabilities approach can be 
expected to be more successful at preventing harm than a focus on resources or utility. The 
capabilities approach can also deal with situations where individuals’ capabilities are reduced by 
their choice to reject HET. These cases demonstrate that states must, at times, do more than simply 
providing the technology to their citizens if they are to ensure their capabilities are protected. The 
capabilities approach is also useful as more than a tool to determine which HETs states ought to 
ensure to their citizens. We can see that some HETs are harmful, and to protect its citizens from 
these technologies the state must act to restrict access to these harmful HETs. This may include 
banning some technologies where the main harm is not caused by the inequality they may create but 
from their direct impact on individuals, society, and capabilities. This conclusion further strengthens 
support for the capabilities approach as it demonstrates its ability to provide valuable advice 
regarding HET, including recommendations of bans for certain technologies that, if accepted, would 
only cause harm. 
 
Applying the capabilities approach to determine how states should regulate HETs in order to be just 
can be expected to be a successful method for combating harmful enhancement inequality. The 
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capabilities approach not only supports states ensuring the availability of HETs to prevent 
inequality, as I concluded in Swindells (2014), but the approach also requires states to take a variety 
of other regulatory actions to prevent harm from HET. The capabilities approach will allow states to 
not only determine which HET to ensure, but also to understand what it means to have ensured 
these technologies, such as determining to what level they must be ensured, and when the state may 
need to ban a technology that threatens harm other than those posed by inequality. Applying the 
capabilities approach to the problem of enhancement inequality can be expected to provide real 
policy advice to assist states when they are considering how to best mitigate harmful inequality. It 
tells states what they must ensure to their citizens and also to what level they can be expected to 
ensure it to. In terms of regulating HET, the capabilities approach provides states with regulatory 
advice regarding all possible technological developments in a general way by providing a 
framework to determine what regulatory actions best ensure justice and prevent harm. Not only can 
the capabilities approach provide guidance around technologies that already exist but it can also be 
expected to appropriately deal with unpredictable future technologies and their unpredictable 
impact on society. Therefore, the capabilities approach can be applied to developing HETs to 
determine how a just state must act to protect their citizens from harm and ensure their basic 
entitlements are met. 
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